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I. Taking responsibility, demanding responsibility: human rights 
in climate change litigation 
‘Since our leaders are behaving like children, we will have to take the responsibility they 
should have taken long ago’ – although harsh and polemic, many people would agree with the 
words Greta Thunberg said at the 24th Convention of Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (‘UNFCCC’)1 in Poland on 4 December 2018.2 
Almost 30 years after the signing of the UNFCCC in 1992, the current measures do not even 
come close to the efforts necessary to keep global warming below 2°, let alone 1,5° Celsius 
and to prevent catastrophic climate change.3 
 
It is thus no surprise that many people feel they cannot wait for political leaders and instead 
want to ‘take responsibility’ and try to force more decisive action against climate change. To 
this end, activist employ virtually all available measures of mobilisation: From surging 
support for ‘green’ parties, to mass demonstrations, to creative forms of protest like flash 
mobs, to lobbying and – of course – litigation. With important parts of international climate 
change law being non-binding or too unambitious in nature, the only regime that might oblige 
governments all over the world appears to be international human rights law.4 This has led 
some scholars to speak of a potential ‘rights turn in climate change litigation’.5 Nonetheless, 
challenges and impediments remain and the potential of human rights to limit climate change 
has not yet been fully employed.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to map the current relation between international human rights 
law and climate change more clearly to clarify its potential in the fight against climate change. 
To this end, the focus will be on the following question: Does international human rights law 
impose on states a concrete and enforceable duty to mitigate climate change by reducing 
emissions? 
 
1 Entry into force 21 March 1994, currently 197 ratifications (all information on international treaties is 
according to the website of the United Nations Treaty Collection, available at 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx?clang=_en, accessed 4 October 2020). 
2 Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/49812183 (accessed 6 July 2020). 
3 See for example J Knox ‘Bringing Human Rights to Bear on Climate Change’ (2019) 9 Climate Law at 178. 
4 L Collins ‘Are we there yet? The Right to Environment in International and European law (2007) 3 McGill 
International Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy at 125; The World Bank Human Rights and 
Climate Change (2011) at 8. 
5 J Peel & H Osofsky ‘A Rights Turn in Climate Change Litigation?’ (2018) 7 Transnational Environmental 





In order to answer this question, it will in a first step be necessary to define the framework of 
the present dissertation, namely the central terms ‘climate change’ and ‘international human 
rights law’ as well as their relation. The third section will then enlarge upon this relation by 
describing the factual impacts that climate change has on the full enjoyment of human rights 
as acknowledged in human rights law. Following this, the fourth section will discuss the 
central question: if the described factual impacts lead to actual legal obligations on states and 
which these are. The discussion will try to anchor a possible duty to mitigate firmly within the 
prevalent human rights legal system. Problematic issues, namely of causation and limitations 
due to separation of power shall be examined as well as possible arguments to overcome these 
issues. To this end, the dissertation will develop as a central argument that human rights law 
not only requires states to not cause harm but also to avoid causing the risk of harm as far as 
reasonable. Thereby, it is possible to overcome the problem of specific causation between a 
particular human rights impact and a particular state’s emission. The fifth section will then 
examine to what extent this obligation can be applied on a global scale in order to promote 
more climate justice, despite the traditional territorial limitation of human rights. Finally, 
some concluding remarks will briefly sum up the key results with regards to the potential for a 
human rights duty to mitigate. 
 
II. Framework: Climate change and human rights law 
Both of the central terms of this paper describe complex, multi-layered matters: While 
‘climate change’ encompasses several global causes and effects, ‘human rights law’ addresses 
a multitude of instruments, actors and legal and sometimes philosophical concepts. The 
following explanations shall help establish the framework of the paper by defining the central 
topics more clearly. 
 
1. Climate change 
Article 1(2) UNFCCC defines ‘climate change’ as follows: 
‘Climate change means a change of climate which is attributed directly or 
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global 
atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed 




As a political and legal, rather than a scientific document, the UNFCCC does not dwell on an 
in-depth explanation of the physical processes behind climate change. Critical readers might 
even take exception to a text which defines climate change as ‘a change of climate’. The only 
hint to the physical processes is that it occurs through an alteration of the ‘composition of the 
global atmosphere’. The real value of Art. 1(2) UNFCCC is that it puts the focus on who is 
responsible for the entire development: human beings. Other than the common language, the 
UNFCCC disregards natural changes in the climate and understands as climate change only 
processes which can be ‘attributed directly or indirectly to human activity’. 
 
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to first revisit the scientific side of climate change, the way it is 
summarized in the reports of the International Panel on Climate Change (‘IPCC’). Article 1(2) 
UNFCCC refers to the process of climate change by mentioning an alteration of the 
‘composition of the global atmosphere’. This alteration occurs through the emission6 of 
greenhouse gases (‘GHG’) which are defined as ‘gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both 
natural and anthropogenic that absorb and re-emit infrared radiation’, Art. 1(5) UNFCCC. 
The effect of these GHG is that energy of radiation which would otherwise have dissipated 
into space now stays in the atmosphere in form of heat energy.7 While climate change is more 
complex than just this warming process, it is the fundamental, underlying cause of virtually 
all other changes. Global warming can therefore often be used in a synonymous sense to 
climate change. 
 
Since the industrialization in the 18th century, human beings have emitted enormous quantities 
of GHG, especially carbon dioxide (‘CO2’), methane (‘CH4’) and nitrous oxide (‘N2O’).8 
This human activity ‘has led to atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and 
nitrous oxide that are unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years.’9 In conformity with 
the greenhouse effect, this rising concentration of greenhouse gases was accompanied by an 
increase in temperature. It is estimated that the average surface temperature already has 
increased by circa 0,5°C since 1951.10 And: ‘It is extremely likely that human influence has 
been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century.’11 
 
6 Article 1(4) UNFCCC. 
7 This basic process was already explained in the First Assessment Report of the IPCC First Assessment Report 
and 1992 Supplement (1992) at 8-9. 
8 IPCC Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report at 3 Figure SPM.1. 
9 Ibid at 4. 
10 Ibid at 6. 





In a sensitive, interlinked system like the climate,12 such a rise in temperature has a vast 
multitude of consequences on both natural and human systems. Already today, there is 
notable certainty among scientists that climate change has led to, for example, more heat 
waves, more frequent and intense heavy precipitation events and, at the same time, more 
frequent and intense droughts.13 These changes are predicted with high certainty to become 
even more pronounced in the future.14 Under a scenario without additional efforts to limit 
emissions, the IPCC predicts an average rise between 2.2. and 3.7°C and a global mean sea 
level rise between 0.48 to 0.63m in relation to the period 1986-2005 until the year 2100.15 
 
To avoid this scenario statesmen and -women around the world must take decisive action 
regarding mitigation which the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (‘OHCHR’) has defined as follows: 
‘Mitigation aims to minimize the extent of global warming by reducing 
emission levels and stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere’16 
It is the question of this paper if they can be compelled to do so by using the law, more 
specifically: human rights law. 
 
2. International Human rights law 
The term ‘international human rights law’, however, also requires some clarification. To start, 
the word ‘international’ shall signify that the focus of this paper are international and regional 
human rights treaties. Human rights provisions in national constitutions can only play an 
incidental role. This is because the main interest is to find arguments and strategies which 
ideally can work all over the world, not just in a particular country. In this context, most 
jurisdictions follow the guidelines of international human rights law or apply them directly. 
Nonetheless, domestic laws and especially case law can in certain circumstances provide 
useful judicial arguments that may apply equally to international human rights guarantees. 
 
 
12 See Art. 1(3) UNFCCC. 
13 IPCC op cit note 11 at 7, Table SPM.1. 
14 Ibid. 
15 IPCC op cit note 8 at 60, Table 2.1.  
16 OHCHR Report on the Relationship between Climate Change and Human Rights (2009) = UN Doc 
A/HRC/10/61 para 12; strictly speaking mitigation can also be achieved by the enhancement of sinks in the 




a) Foundations: International instruments 
Even within the international human rights law, however, one cannot rely on a single, unitary 
source. Notwithstanding the character of human rights as universal and indivisible,17 their 
legal implementation can be described as ‘fragmented; there is no such thing as a standard 
human rights catalogue or a global human rights monitoring body.’18 The closest to a ‘single 
human rights catalogue’ is the so called International Bill of Rights,19 which consists of the 
guarantees contained in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘UDHR’)20, the 
1966 International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (‘IPPCR’)21 and the 1966 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’).22 This trio can 
be seen as fundamental to international human rights law because of its virtually universal 
application in all countries in the world: While originally a non-binding resolution of the 
General Assembly (‘GA’), many – according to some scholars all – rights of the UDHR are 
now considered binding customary law.23 The two covenants, on the other hand, are binding 
international treaties which have been ratified by 173 (ICCPR) and 171 (ICESCR) states 
respectively, out of 195 states.24 Even though the rights in the ICESCR are subject to the 
‘progressive realization’ limitation in Art. 2(1) ICESCR, they are justiciable if the state does 
indeed have the required resources and simply did not accord the rights appropriate priority. 
Next to the ICCPR and ICESCR, there are several other international human rights treaties 
which guarantee rights in relation to specific issues or for specific groups of people. In 
comparison to the rights enshrined in the UDHR and the two Covenants, these treaties are less 
comprehensive as they apply only to certain issues or people. 
 
An important aspect to keep in mind is the degree of enforceability of human rights 
instruments. Although most of the international treaties are now supplemented by quasi-
judicial bodies which are empowered to not only review state reports but also to receive and 
 
17 See Vienna Declaration on Human Rights (1993) para 1. 
18 S Ouald-Chaib ‘Introduction’ in E Brems & S Ouald-Chaib (eds) Fragmentation and Integration in Human 
Rights Law (2018) at 2. 
19 D Anton & D Shelton ‘The International Protection of Human Rights’ in D Anton & D Shelton (eds) 
Environmental Protection and Human Rights (2011) at 224. 
20 General Assembly Resolution 217A (10 December 1948). 
21 Entry into force 23 March 1976, currently 173 ratifications. 
22 Entry into force 3 January 1976, currently 171 ratifications.  
23 Anton & Shelton op cit note 19 at 230; M Wewerinke-Singh ‘State Responsibility for human rights violations 
associated with Climate Change’ in S Duyck et al (eds) Routledge Handbook of Human Rights and Climate 
Governance (2018) at 78. 




adjudicate individual complaints,25 they do not dispose of effective mechanisms to enforce 
their decisions. Their interpretations of the respective treaties is generally seen as not legally 
binding.26 Regardless of the lack of a formal enforcement procedure, many states consider 
themselves bound by decisions of the treaty Committees. Moreover, state courts often take 
international law, including the Committee interpretations thereof, into account when 
applying human rights in domestic constitutions. A strong case for climate protection based 
on an international human rights instruments can thus strengthen domestic climate change 
litigation all over the world.27 
 
b) Foundations: Regional systems 
In addition to the international human rights treaties, there are currently five regional human 
rights systems with greatly varying degrees of integration, enforcement and credibility: The 
well-established systems are the Inter-American human rights system, based on the 1948 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (‘ADRDM’)28 and the 1969 American 
Convention on Human Rights (‘ACHR’),29 and monitored by the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (‘IACmHR’) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (‘IACtHR’); 
secondly the European human rights system, based on the 1950 European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’)30 and monitored by the 
European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’); and thirdly the African human rights system, 
based on the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘ACHPR’)31 and 
monitored by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘ACmHPR’) and the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘ACtHPR’). Next to these long-standing and 
well-acknowledged systems, recent years have seen the adoption of the Arab Charter on 
Human Rights (‘Arab Charter’)32 and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (‘ASEAN 
Declaration’).33 Not only are these latter two instruments younger than the first three regional 
systems and their institutional capacities less developed, there is also significant concern over 
 
25 Most importantly Art. 1 Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, entry into force 23 March 1976, currently 116 
ratifications; and Art. 1 Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, entry into force 5 May 2013, currently 24 
ratifications. 
26 N Ando ‘General Comments/Recommendations’ in R Wolfrum (ed) MPEIL (2008) para 41. 
27 Peel & Osofsky op cit note 5 at 42. 
28 Adopted 2 May 1948; although originally not legally binding, the ADRDM is now regarded as binding on the 
members of the Organisation of American States, C Grossmann ‘American Declaration on the Rights and Duties 
of Man’ in R Wolfrum (ed) MPEIL (2010) paras 11-16.  
29 Entry into force 18 July 1978, currently 25 ratifications. 
30 Entry into force 3 September 1953, currently 47 ratifications. 
31 Entry into force 21 October 1986, currently 54 ratifications. 
32 Entry into force 15 March 2008. 




some provisions that might serve to undermine human rights guarantees, rather than reinforce 
them.34 In light of these uncertainties, arguments taken from the three older regional systems 
will often carry higher persuasive power than those from the two recent instruments. 
 
In comparison to the international human rights treaty system described earlier, regional 
systems often have stronger enforcement mechanisms. For example, the judgements of the 
ECtHR,35 the IACtHR36 and the ACtHPR37 are legally binding on parties that have ratified the 
respective establishing treaties. In consequence, they can often provide detailed case law that 
influences the interpretation of international human rights norms.38 
 
c) Relation to other fields of law 
While the clear focus of this paper is human rights law, it will become clear that many 
questions are inextricably linked to other areas of international law. For example, the rules of 
state responsibility under general public international law might be fruitful when asking for 
attribution of human rights impacts to GHG-emitting activities by states.39 Important ideas 
from climate change law and international environmental law include the precautionary 
principle and the no harm rule, both of which might help interpret or even extend human 
rights provisions and respective duties.40 The central question in each of these cases remains, 
however, if the legal principle can indeed be transferred to human rights law. 
 
d) Summary 
Of the mentioned human rights treaties, some are more promising for the purposes of this 
paper than others. This is because the objective of the following discussion is to identify 
rights guarantees and arguments that can be used to enforce climate protection in as many 
countries as possible. For this purpose, comprehensive treaties with a large number of 
ratifications, high authority and effective enforcement are more helpful than smaller, 
specialised treaties. In the following, the focus will therefore often lie on the big treaties, 
especially the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Nonetheless, relevant right guarantees from the more 
 
34 For the Arab Charter M Rishmawi ‘Arab Charter on Human Rights’ in R Wolfrum (ed) MPEIL (2008) para 
64. 
35 Art. 46(1) ECHR. 
36 Art. 68(1) ACHR. 
37 Art. 30 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, entry into force 25 January 2004, currently 30 ratifications. 
38 See generally S Atapattu ‘Climate change under regional human rights systems’ in S Duyck et al (eds) 
Routledge Handbook of Human Rights and Climate Governance (2018) at 128. 
39 See infra section IV.2.c). 




specific treaties shall also be mentioned. More importantly, lines of reasoning and arguments 
developed under a specialised or regional human rights system that can be transferred to the 
general treaties can exert a strong persuasive influence on the interpretation of the universal 
treaties.41  
 
3. Bringing climate change and international human rights law into relation 
The relevance of environmental aspects for human rights was discovered relatively early. As 
soon as 1968 did the General Assembly express its concern over the effects of environmental 
change on, among other things, the ‘enjoyment of basic human rights, in developing as well 
as developed countries’.42 Four years later, the 1972 United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment in Stockholm reinforced and specified the link between environment 
and human rights: The environment is ‘essential to … the enjoyment of basic human rights – 
even the right to life itself’.43 While these documents do not yet make specific reference to the 
then rather obscure phenomenon of climate change, they laid the groundwork by establishing 
the link between environment and human rights. 
 
On this basis, mainly two efforts can be seen to have clarified the human rights impacts of 
climate change, both of which came from groups of people immediately affected: The 2005 
Inuit Petition to the IACmHR (‘Inuit Petition’) and the 2007 Male’ Declaration on the Human 
Dimensions of Climate Change (‘Male’ Declaration‘).44 The Inuit Petition alleged that the 
United States as the biggest greenhouse gas emitter of the time were violating various rights 
of the Artic Inuit protected under the ADRDM. Although unsuccessful in litigation (the 
IACmHR rejected the claim citing lack of evidence), it ‘was the first of a cascade of efforts to 
bring human rights to bear on climate change’45 and ‘galvanized a new international dialogue 
on climate change as a human rights concern.’46 In the Male’ Declaration, a number of Small 
Island Developing States called for, among other things, a ‘detailed study into the effects of 
climate change on the full enjoyment of human rights’. This study was conducted by the 
OHCHR and published in January 2009.47 The resulting report can be seen as the first work to 
 
41 The World Bank op cit note 4 at 46. 
42 General Assembly Resolution 2398 of 3 December 1968. 
43 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment = UN Doc A/CONF.48/14/REV.1 
at 3. 
44 J Knox ‘Linking Climate Change and Human Rights at the United Nations’ (2009) 33 Harvard Environmental 
Law Review at 479-84.  
45 Knox op cit note 3 at 166 
46 R Bratspies ‘Claimed Not Granted: Finding a Human Right to a Healthy Environment’ (2017) 26 
Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems at 277. 




examine in detail the impact of climate change on human rights. This process of applying 
human rights law to climate change has been aptly described as a ‘greening of human rights’48 
or an ‘ecologically literate reading of existing human rights’.49 Since then, more or more 
attention has been given to the nexus between climate change and human rights which has 
since become a ‘sustained focus’.50 
 
Recently, the 2015 Paris Agreement under the UNFCCC broke new ground by being the first 
international environmental convention to explicitly refer to human rights obligations in 
climate change in its preamble: 
‘Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, 
Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, 
promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the 
right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, 
migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable 
situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, 
empowerment of women and intergenerational equity’51 
The significance of this reference is evaluated quite differently with opinions ranging from 
eulogistic to highly critical assessments.52 For present purposes two things shall be pointed 
out: First, the preamble demands that states ‘respect, promote and consider their respective 
obligations on human rights’ (emphasis added). This deliberate deviation from the more 
established tripartite duty to ‘respect, protect and fulfil’ works to limit the effect of the 
recognition of human rights in the Paris Agreement.53 Secondly, the formulation ‘when taking 
action’ (emphasis added) indicates that the signing parties are more inclined to accept human 
rights duties when designing and implying measures against climate change,54 not so much 
obligations that require to take such actions in the first place (which are the topic of this 
paper).55 
 
48 A Boyle ‘Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next?’ in A Trindade & C Leal (eds) Human Rights and 
Environment (2017) at 10. 
49 Collins op cit note 4 at 127-8. 
50 Peel & Osofsky op cit note 5 at 42. 
51 Preamble Paris Agreement, entry into force 4 November 2016, currently 189 ratifications. 
52 Overview at L Rajamani ‘Integrating Human Rights in the Paris Climate Architecture: Contest, Context and 
Consequence’ (2019) 9 Climate Law at 185-6. 
53 Ibid at 192-3; S Atapattu ‘The Right to a Healthy Environment and Climate Change’ in J Knox & R Pejan 
(eds) The Human Right to a Healthy Environment (2018) at 258. 
54 The problem of negative human rights impacts by climate change response measures is not subject of this 
paper, see only OHCHR op cit note 16 at 66. 





Regarding mitigation, the Paris Agreement requires state parties to ‘prepare, communicate 
and maintain successive nationally determined contributions’ (‘NDCs’).56 While the treaty 
gives certain guidelines as to how these NDCs shall be determined,57 it is essentially in the 
hands of each party to decide how ambitious its mitigation efforts will be. Moreover, there is 
no mechanism that could enforce the realisation of the NDCs.58  
 
In light of this system of international climate protection which ‘relies fundamentally on the 
good faith of states in determining the ambition and implementation of their NDCs’,59 the 
question arises how affected individuals can ensure responsibility and accountability for 
climate change impact. Against the more facilitative approach of the Paris Agreement, a 
human rights case for mitigation could provide the necessary prescriptive elements. 
III. Factual climate change impacts on human rights 
While there are still many open questions regarding the legal demands of human rights law 
vis-à-vis climate change, little doubt exists today as to the factual impact that a changing 
climate can have on various human rights. As Hall & Weiss put it: ‘In short, we consider the 
question of whether climate change implicates human rights to be closed’.60 Of course, it is a 
more complex matter which exact impacts occur and how.  
 
1. Assessing the impact of climate change on established human rights 
In its seminal report, the OHCHR noted that ‘global warming will potentially have 
implications for the full range of human rights’.61 Nonetheless, certain human rights 
guarantees are likely to be impacted more than others. In order to illustrate the impact of 
climate change, the following analysis will address the legal basis, the content and specific 
 
56 Art. 4(2) Paris Agreement. 
57 In particular the reference in Art. 4(1) to the overall goal of ‘[h]olding the increase in the global average 
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase 
to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’ in Art. 2(1)(a), as well as the requirement of progression in Art. 4(3) Paris 
Agreement.  
58 P Minnerop ‘Climate Protection Agreements’ in R Wolfrum (ed) MPEIL (2018) para 26. 
59 Rajamani op cit note 52 at 194. 
60 M Hall & D Weiss ‘Avoiding Adaptation Apartheid’ (2012) 37 Yale Journal of International Law at 345; 
going further S Atapattu & A Schapper Human Rights and the Environment (2019) at 3 who state that ‘[i]t is 
now generally recognized that human rights can be infringed by environmental degradation’ (emphasis added). 
The term ‘infringed’ points to an (attributable) violation of a right, not just a factual impact. 
61 OHCHR op cit note 16 para 20; see also the graphic overview in M Limon ‘Human Rights and Climate 




impairment of a number of rights. It is important to note, however, that the effects on different 
human rights are usually not separate and independent, but rather interlinked and overlapping. 
 
a) The right to life 
A central aspect in this regard is the ‘supreme right’62 of the catalogue of international human 
rights: the right to life. It is enshrined, for example, in Art. 3 UDHR, Art. 6 ICCPR and the 
major regional human rights treaties.63 
 
The right to life protects its bearers against ‘unnatural and premature deaths’.64  Climate 
change, however, leads to numerous effects that lead to otherwise preventable deaths. 
Obvious cases are extreme weather events, such as storms, floods and wildfires.65 But also 
more subtle developments like the spread of vector-borne diseases66 and consequences of 
malnutrition67 can lead to ‘premature deaths’. The Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’) which 
monitors the ICCPR has listed climate change as one of ‘the most pressing and serious threats 
to the ability of present and future generations to enjoy the right to life.’68 In this context, it is 
important to note that already today, climate change has been linked to 150000 premature 
deaths per year.69 The deadly consequences of climate change hence are by no means a distant 
dystopia.70 
 
b) The right to the highest attainable standard of health 
Related to the right to life is the right to the highest attainable standard of health which is 
recognised in Art. 25(1) UDHR (as part of the right to an adequate standard of living) and 
most prominently in Art. 12(1) CESCR.71 According to the CESCR Committee, Art. 12(1) 
CESCR includes not only the right to health care, but also the ‘underlying determinants of 
health’, which include inter alia ‘healthy … environmental conditions’.72 
 
 
62 HRC GC No. 6 (1982) para 1; GC No. 14 (1984) para 1. 
63 Art. 2(1) ECHR, Art. 4 ACHPR, Art. 1 ADRDM, Art. 4(1) ACHR. 
64 HRC GC No. 36 (2018) para 6. 
65 OHCHR op cit note 16 para 22. 
66 D Boyd Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of 
a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment = UN Doc A/74/161 (2019) para 29. 
67 See in detail infra section III.1.c). 
68 HRC GC No. 36 para 62. 
69 Boyd op cit note 66 para 29. 
70 Although the predicted consequences are even more dire, see World Health Organisation Quantitative risk 
assessment of the effects of climate change on selected causes of death, 2030s and 2050s (2014) at 1 which 
expects 250,000 additional deaths per year between 2030 and 2050 due to various effects of climate change. 
71 See also Art. 11 European Social Charter (as revised), Art. 16(1) ACHPR, Art. 10 Protocol of San Salvador.  




Climate change affects many of the environmental conditions of human life and in many 
cases changes them into an unhealthier state. According to the IPCC, ‘climate change will 
impact human health mainly by exacerbating health problems that already exist’ and ‘is 
expected to lead to increases in ill-health in many regions’.73 For example, a warmer climate 
leads to a larger spread of vectoral diseases like Malaria.74 Moreover, it will impact negatively 
other conditions of good health that are protected by Art. 12(1) ICESCR, such as water and 
food security.75 Ultimately, climate change will increase the demand on national health 
systems around the world and thereby threaten the right to ‘timely and appropriate health 
care’.76 
 
c) The right to adequate food 
As mentioned, climate change is moreover predicted to exacerbate malnutrition for many 
people which would impact the right to adequate food. This human right is entrenched most 
prominently in Art. 25(1) UDHR and Art. 11(1) CESCR as part of an adequate standard of 
living and in Art. 11(2) CESCR as ‘the fundamental right of everyone to be free from 
hunger’. 
 
The ICESCR-Committee notes that the ‘right to adequate food is realized when every man, 
woman and child, alone or in community with others, have physical and economic access at 
all times to adequate food or means for its procurement.’77 Climate change and especially 
global warming can lead to contrasting effects on food security in different parts of the world: 
While certain locations, especially higher latitudes, may benefit and increase food 
production,78 large regions will see their food resources negatively affected, most notably in 
fisheries and crop production.79 On balance, climate change will affect many sources of food 
negatively80 and thereby reduce the possibilities for ‘feeding oneself’ as well as food 
distribution systems. This threatens the full enjoyment of the right to adequate food for many 
people. According to calculations by the World Food Programme, the number of people at 
 
73 IPCC op cit note 8 at 14. 
74 OHCHR op cit note 16 para 32; P Hunt Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health = UN Doc A/62/214 (2007) paras 
100-1. 
75 ICESCR-Committee GC No. 14 para 11. 
76 Ibid.  
77 ICESCR-Committee GC No. 12 (1999) para 6. 
78 OHCHR op cit note 16 para 26; IPCC op cit note 8 at 13 speaks of benefits for ‘individual locations’. 
79 Ibid at 15, figure SPM.9. 




risk of hunger in 2050 will be 10-20 per cent higher as a result of climate change and the 
number of malnourished children could be 21 per cent higher.81 
 
d) The right to water  
An explicit, stand-alone right to water is not enshrined in the major human rights treaties. In 
particular, water, other than food, is not mentioned specifically in Art. 11 ICESCR. 
Nonetheless, access to clean and sufficient water is seen as indispensable for an adequate 
standard of living in the meaning of Art. 11 ICESCR and hence a right to water is 
acknowledged within that article.82 The right to water is moreover ‘inextricably related’ to 
Art. 12(1) ICESCR, the right to the highest attainable standard of health.83 
 
The content of the right to water encompasses four major aspects: Availability, quality, 
accessibility (both physical and economic) and, as a procedural right, information 
accessibility.84 At that, one has not only a right to drinking water but also to water for other 
basic needs, such as sanitation, washing of clothes, food preparation etc.85 In the context of 
climate change, higher temperatures lead to the melting of glaciers and snow covers which 
many people rely on for their supply of fresh water.86 Already today, these effects can be felt 
in some parts of the world.87 Other water resources, especially groundwater, will most likely 
also be reduced in dry regions.88 Droughts will equally threaten the water supply of many 
people.89 Moreover, extreme floods can impair water infrastructure and water quality.90 
 
e) The right to adequate housing 
The risk of floods is a major threat also to the right to adequate housing. Like food, adequate 
housing is recognised explicitly as part of the right to an adequate standard of living in 
Art. 11(1) ICESCR. 
 
According to the ICESCR-Committee, the right must be understood comprehensively as ‘the 
right to live somewhere in security, peace and dignity’.91 Among other elements, this 
 
81 World Food Programme Climate Change and Hunger. Responding to the Challenge (2009) at 14. 
82 ICESCR-Committee GC 15 (2003) para 3, emphasizing the word ‘including’ in Art. 11 CESCR. 
83 Ibid para 3. 
84 Ibid para 12. 
85 Ibid para 12.  
86 OHCHR op cit note 16 para 29, calculating the affected group at one sixth of world population. 
87 Boyd op cit note 66 para 38 citing the example of Bolivia. 
88 IPCC op cit note 8 at 13. 
89 OHCHR op cit note 16 para 29. 
90 Boyd op cit note 66 para 39. 




encompasses the requirement that housing must be ‘habitable’ – protecting its habitants ‘from 
cold, damp, heat, rain, wind or other threats to health, structural hazards, and disease 
vectors’.92 As a consequence of climate change, many regions that are now populated will 
become inhabitable. This is particularly true for coastal and delta areas which will be affected 
by sea level rises, storms and flooding. In some parts, these developments have already led to 
resettlements.93 As more areas become inhabitable or incapable of sustaining their 
populations, the stress on the housing market will increase, forcing people to live in worse 
conditions, especially in urban areas.94 
 
f) The right to self-determination 
The right to self-determination of peoples is most prominently enshrined in the common 
Art. 1 ICCPR and ICESCR. It is also recognised as a right in Art. 3, 4 UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples.95 Art. 1(2) and 55 UNCh refer to the ‘principle of … self-
determination of peoples’. 
 
Other than the previously mentioned rights, the right to self-determination is vested not in 
individuals but in ‘peoples’; it is a collective human right. Moreover, it cannot be asserted 
under the Optional Protocol to ICCPR.96 According to the HRC, Art. 1(2) ICCPR, ICESCR 
entails that ‘[i]n no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence’.97 Other 
than the other rights in the ICCPR, which apply only so far as the territory or jurisdiction of a 
state go,98 the right to self-determination applies to state parties even outside their territory.99 
 
However, through climate change certain peoples might lose exactly their ‘own means of 
subsistence’. This is true in particular for small island states whose very existence is 
endangered by sea level rises.100 It is evident that the disappearance of a nation’s whole 
territory affects their right to self-determination. For indigenous peoples, the connection to 
 
92 Ibid para 8. 
93 OHCHR op cit note 16 para 36. 
94 B Lewis ‘Human Rights Duties to Future Generations’ (2016) 34 Netherlands Quaterly of Human Rights at 
210. 
95 As a General Assembly Declaration, these articles are strictly speaking not legally binding, but can provide 
guidelines for the interpretation of binding norms such as Art. 1 ICCPR, ICESCR. 
96 M Wewerinke-Singh State Responsibility, Climate Change and Human Rights under International Law (2019) 
at 118. 
97 HRC GC No. 12 (1984) para 5. 
98 Art. 2(1) CCPR: ‘all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’, in detail see infra section 
V.2.a). 
99 HRC GC No. 12 paras 5-6 on Art. 1(2) and 1(3) respectively. 
100 OHCHR op cit note 16 paras 40-1. See also IPCC op cit note 8 at 13 which predicts a sea level rise of up to 




their traditional lands is crucial for their way of live and the enjoyment of their right to self-
determination. If ancestral lands become inhabitable or can no longer sustain the livelihoods 
of indigenous peoples, their right to self-determination is severely affected.101 
 
g) Other human rights 
This list is by no means exhaustive, other guarantees can as well be impacted. For example, 
the right to property102 will be touched when assets are lost in extreme weather events 
triggered or exacerbated by climate change.103 Especially in the context of the European 
human rights system, environmental factors that affect applicants have frequently been 
deemed violations of their right to privacy.104 
 
2. An (emerging) right to a healthy environment? 
While emphasizing the impact of climate change on established civil, political or economic 
rights is helpful for clarifying the consequences of climate change, some advocates opine that 
this ‘cobbling together’105 of essentially non-environmental human rights to address 
environmental issues such as climate change is an insufficient measure. Rather, they argue, 
one should look for a ‘separate, independent human right, not dependent on the existing 
protected rights recognized in the international covenants’:106 A human right to a healthy 
environment. 
 
a) Content of a right to a healthy environment and relevance for duty to mitigate 
While at first glance it is very plausible that such a right would be impacted by climate 
change, the exact nature of the effects is difficult to ascertain due to the still vague content of 
the right. This starts with the exact name of the right: While the right to a ‘healthy’ 
environment is referred to frequently,107 a number of different adjectives are indeed being 
used, for example ‘clean, healthy, ecologically balanced, sound, healthful, adequate, viable, 
decent, sustainable’.108 A different adjective can of course shift the focus and content of the 
 
101 Knox op cit note 44 at 486 (the right is “destroyed”). 
102 Art. 17(1) UDHR, Art. 1 First Protocol to ECHR, Art. 31 ADHR, Art. 21(1) ACHR. 
103 IPCC op cit note 8 at 14. 
104 Atapattu op cit note 38 at 130. In detail see infra section IV.2.c). 
105 R Bratspies ‘Claimed not granted: Finding a human right to a healthy environment’ (2017) 26 Transnational 
Law and Contemporary Problems at 271. 
106 Collins op cit note 4 at 131. 
107 Ibid at 137. 




right. For the purposes of this paper, the name of a ‘healthy’ environment is being used as it is 
the most common in discussions and has also found its way into treaties.109 
 
Some clarification on the content of this right can be found in the case law of regional human 
rights systems. In Africa, the ACmHPR interprets the right in the following sense: ‘It requires 
the state to take reasonable and other measures to prevent pollution and ecological 
degradation, to promote conservation, and to secure an ecologically sustainable development 
and use of natural resources.’110 In light of the impacts of climate change which must be seen 
to lead to ‘ecological degradation’ and to threaten ‘conservation’ and ‘ecologically 
sustainable development’, the right to a healthy environment would be impacted profoundly 
by climate change.111 
 
In the literature, the right to a clean environment is often understood to encompass two 
parts:112 Procedural and substantive rights. The former are currently already acknowledged 
individually in certain treaties but can and should easily be integrated into a larger, 
comprehensive right to a clean environment. This would be in line with Art. 1 Aarhus 
Convention and Escazú Agreement which make indirect reference to such a right.113 The 
substantial rights could be seen to include an individual or collective right to an environment 
that is healthy for the human rights bearers and moreover acknowledges the intrinsic value of 
the environment.114 Nonetheless, the right would still be vested in human beings, not in nature 
itself. While such a conception has been applied in certain national jurisdictions,115 it lies far 
outside the traditional international human rights law.116 
 
Naturally, the substantive part of a right to a healthy environment would have significant 
overlap with other human rights,117 in particular the right to the highest achievable standard of 
 
109 Most importantly Art. 24 Banjul Charter and Art. 11 Protocol of San Salvador; according to the ACmHPR, 
the right is ‘widely known’ as ‘right to a healthy environment’, SERAC v Nigera (Communication 155/96, 
October 2001) para 52. 
110 Ibid. 
111 O Quirico ‘Climate Change and State Reponsibility for Human Rights Violations’ (2018) 65 Netherlands 
Internaitonal Law Review at 205. 
112 Collins op cit note 4 at 148; L Rodríguez-Rivera ‘The Right to Environment’ in von Arnould et al (eds) The 
Cambridge Handbook on New Human Rights (2020) at 16. 
113 On the limitations of procedural rights: Rodríguez-Rivera op cit note 112 at 35-6. 
114 Ibid at 13-14; World Bank op cit note 4 at 56. 
115 Atapattu op cit note 53 at 268. 
116 G Handl ‘The Human Right to a Clean Environment and Rights of Nature’ in von Arnould et al (eds) The 
Cambridge Handbook on New Human Rights (2020) at 153. 




health which includes ‘healthy … environment conditions.’118 However, it would seem very 
possible to distinguish the right to a healthy environment from other human rights by 
protecting environmental conditions without the requirement of a concrete threat to an 
individual’s well-being119 and stressing the intrinsic value of the environment which is not 
protected by other rights guarantees.120  
 
Such a right would be highly significant as a basis for a duty to mitigate. As will become 
clearer later, a pivotal problem of human rights obligations with respect to climate change is 
the issue of causation. It is often virtually impossible to prove the specific link between 
climate change and a specific human rights impact as the impact occurs only in an indirect 
manner.121 Insofar as a healthy environment itself was protected under a right to a healthy 
environment, however, claimants would only have to prove a general impact of climate 
change on the general climate, not on individual human beings.122 Obviously, this would 
make the case for a duty to mitigate much easier. 
 
b) Is a right to a healthy environment acknowledged in international human rights 
law? 
The crucial question, however, is if such a right can be seen to exist as an – emerging? – 
human right on the international level.  
 
As mentioned, certain procedural elements have been regionally recognised in Art. 1 Aarhus 
Convention and Art. 1 Escazú Agreement. A substantial right to a healthy environment can be 
found in Art. 24 ACHPR,123 Art. 11(1) Protocol of San Salvador, Art. 38 Arab Charter (as 
part of the right to an adequate standard of living) and Art. 28(f) ASEAN Declaration (‘safe, 
clean and sustainable environment’, also as part of an adequate standard of living). In sum, 
these regional treaties acknowledging a right to a healthy environment in one form or another 
apply to more than 130 states.124 Moreover, on the national level more than 100 states 
 
118 ICESCR-Committee GC No. 14 para 11. 
119 See Rodríguez-Rivera op cit note 112 at 20. 
120 Similar ibid at 26. 
121 Ibid at 20. 
122 Limon op cit note 61 at 469. 
123 Reaffirming and elaborating the right specifically for women in Africa: Art. 18 Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, entry into force 25 November 2005. 
124 J Knox Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of 




recognise a right to a healthy environment in their constitutions and a similar number protects 
the right in ordinary legislation.125 
 
In light of this substantial recognition of a right to a healthy environment on the regional and 
national level, some scholars argue that such a guarantee is emerging as customary law or at 
least a general principle126 on the international level as well.127 Next to national and regional 
law, they rely on Art. 1 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration which ‘introduced the notion of a 
human right to environment into international law for the first time.’128 It reads: 
‘Man [sic] has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate 
conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of 
dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and 
improve the environment for present and future generations.’129 
However, there are already doubts if this is indeed an acknowledgement of the right to a 
healthy environment.130 More importantly, the Stockholm Declaration is a non-binding 
document131 (the introduction to the principles accordingly reads ‘Stating the common 
conviction that‘). There are no legally binding documents on the international level that 
acknowledge a right to a healthy environment.132 Moreover, neither the 1992 Rio Declaration, 
nor the 2015 Paris Agreement make reference to such a right.133 The apparently greater 
number of scholars thus sees no sufficient state practice and opinio juris to support the right’s 
status as customary international law.134 
 
In fact, the debate often demonstrates a deeper conflict of opinion, namely a fundamental 
disagreement between a ‘traditionalist’ view on international human rights law and a more 
‘progressive’ starting point.135 For the latter group, the requirement of factual evidence of 
 
125 Ibid paras 30, 32. 
126 See Art. 38(1) Statute of the International Court of Justice, entry into force 24 October 1945, currently 193 
ratifications. 
127 Rodríguez-Rivera op cit note 112 at 162; Atapattu op cit note 53 at 253; Collins op cit note 4 at 136. 
128 Collins op cit note 4 at 124. 
129 Principle 1 Stockholm Declaration; Rodríguez-Rivera op cit note 112 at 156. 
130 L Sohn ‘Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment’ (1973) 14 Harvard International Law Journal 
at 455; more assertive Collins op cit note 4 at 132. 
131 Sohn op cit note 130 at 515, stating the hope that it might become accepted as customary international law; G 
Handl ‘Human Rights and Protection of the Environment’ in A Trindade (ed) Human Rights and Environmental 
Protection (1995) at 123. 
132 Handl op cit note 131 at 140.  
133 Because of this, Limon op cit note 61 at 472 constates that ‘we have in fact gone backward’. 
134 World Bank op cit note 4 at 57; Handl op cit note 116 at 139-40; Handl op cit note 131 at 121, 123-8. 




state practice regarding a right to a healthy environment is less stringent because the right is 
supported by the ‘will of humanity’136 or arguments of justice. While this vantage point has a 
lot of appeal and promotes a pro-active stance towards climate change, it might be less 
effective, as most states indeed do follow a traditionalist approach and consider ‘state consent 
… the sine qua non of international legal norms’.137 Most states will thus not be prepared to 
accept a right to a healthy environment without sufficient evidence of state practice and 
opinio juris. This would ultimately make it a ‘mere paper right’138 and ineffectual in the fight 
against climate change. 
 
In conclusion, at present most legal scholars deny the existence of a substantive right to a 
healthy environment as a binding rule of public international law139 – a view that international 
mandate holders seem to agree with.140 While certain procedural rights that one can count as 
parts of such a right are explicitly stipulated in treaties and might have become customary 
law,141 a comprehensive, substantial right to a clean environment recognising the intrinsic 
value of nature is currently not part of the catalogue of internationally accepted human rights. 
It can therefore not be impacted by climate change and not be the starting point for any 
obligations. De lege ferenda, however, such a right would be a powerful tool to facilitate the 
response to climate change. 
 
3. Climate Justice: Vulnerability and unequal degrees of impact 
While the described impacts will affect the human rights of a large number of people, the 
severity can differ considerably between and within states. Between different states, some are 
affected more severely by climate change simply for geographical reasons. For example, 
small island states are more at risk of sea rises142 and countries in dry regions are menaced 
more severely by droughts.143 Secondly, not only the degree of impact varies but also to 
 
136 L Rodríguez-Rivera op cit note 112 (‘In light of the universality of human rights, the traditionalists' emphasis 
on state consent in discussing human rights is misplaced. The source of human rights is not the will of states, but 
the will of humanity.’); similar Bratspies op cit note 105 at 271 and 273. 
137 Collins op cit note 4 at 125, see also 126. 
138 Handl op cit note 131 at 121. 
139 Handl op cit note 116 at 157; Limon 61 at 470; A von Arnauld Völkerrecht (3rd ed, 2016) at 402; World Bank 
op cit note 4 at 57. 
140 Knox op cit note 124 paras 37 et seq, advocating for such a right to be legally recognized. 
141 J Knox Mapping Report = UN Doc A/HRC/25/53 (2013) at 29-43. An example for binding environmental 
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which extend a state can react and alleviate its effects. While rich states have an array of 
adaptation measures at their disposal, such as building dikes, new water facilities, early 
warning systems,144 less developed countries will often lack the necessary resources for such 
initiatives.145 Unfortunately, the countries that are impacted most by climate change, often are 
the ones that are least equipped to adapt to it (for example many African countries146 and 
small island states147). This inequality is aggravated by the fact that the people most affected 
by climate change are often the least responsible for climate change as less developed states 
are historically responsible for only a minimal share of GHG-emissions. 
 
Similar inequalities exist at an intra-state level where already disadvantaged groups, such as 
‘women, children, persons living in poverty, members of indigenous peoples and traditional 
communities, older persons, persons with disabilities, national, ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities and displaced persons’148 often bear the brunt of the impacts.  
 
4. Summary 
Taking the prediction by the OHCHR from 2009 that ‘global warming will potentially have 
implications for the full range of human rights’,149 only one adjustment has to be made eleven 
years later: Global warming not only ‘will potentially’ compromise human rights guarantees 
but this process is already well underway, actually. It should nowadays be beyond dispute that 
the consequences of climate change already impact virtually all rights and that this will only 
aggravate over time. Climate change in and of itself, however, cannot be seen as an 
impairment of human rights, as there is no self-standing right to a healthy environment so far. 
Importantly, the human rights impact is by no means evenly distributed. In general terms, less 
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147 Ibid at 1616-17. 
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IV. Human rights obligations in relation to climate change: The 
duty to mitigate 
In contrast to the broad consensus on the factual impact, the question which legal  
consequences arise as a consequence has been problematic from the beginning. 
 
1. Procedural duties and duty to adapt 
11 years ago, the OHCHR noted: ‘While climate change has obvious implications for the 
enjoyment of human rights, it is less obvious whether, and to what extent, such effects can be 
qualified as human rights violations in a strict legal sense.’150 Accordingly, the report 
estimates it ‘doubtful … that an individual would be able to hold a particular State responsible 
for harm caused by climate change’.151 
 
In the years since the OHCHR study, the reluctance towards a human rights-approach seems 
to have lessened considerably. In part due to a better understanding of both the scientific 
processes behind climate change as well as new interpretations of human rights norms, there 
is now considerable agreement that human rights law does indeed impose obligations with 
regard to climate change. This is most evident for procedural duties152 and duties to take 
adaptation measures, that is measures which ‘strengthen the capacity of societies and 
ecosystems to cope with and adapt to climate change risks and impacts.’153  
 
Other than mitigation efforts, adaptation measures do not reduce climate change but only 
cushion its consequences. Put poignantly, they do not treat the illness but contain the 
symptoms. In that, they have a crucial role in protecting human rights against climate change. 
For example, the building of new dikes can shelter human lives from rising sea levels and 
floods, thereby protecting the right to life. Investments in water systems can attenuate risks to 
water security, protecting the right to water. Improvements in the health sector can help 
secure the right to the highest attainable standard of health and reduce climate change induced 
risks. In the end, these measures can be very successful in protecting human rights. From the 
perspective of virtually all of the threatened rights, it does not matter – at least at first – if 
climate change continues to occur. As long as the bearers of human rights are sufficiently 
 
150 Ibid para 70; see also Limon op cit 61 note at 457 (‘It is true of course that, at present, it is very difficult to 
argue that climate change represents a violation of human rights’). 
151 OHCHR op cit note 16 para 72. 
152 Knox op cit note 3 at 174. 




shielded from its impacts, no rights are being violated. In this light, it is now broadly accepted 
that states have an obligation protect their populations from specific climate change 
impacts.154 This assessment is based largely on the ECtHR-jurisprudence on environmental 
threats, notably the case of Budayeva v. Russia.155 On a national level, the Lahore High Court 
in the much-noted decision of Leghari v Federation of Pakistan found, among others, a 
violation of the right to life as enshrined in Art. 9 of the Pakistani Constitution because the 
State had failed to implement adaptation measures.156 
 
In the words of former Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment John Knox:‘[w]ith 
respect to mitigation, the situation may be more complicated’.157 While many commentators 
are in principle open to such an obligation, it is still little substantiated and very vague: States 
are merely required to ‘do what they can’, and ‘at a minimum … to take concrete actions to 
reduce their emissions on a schedule consistent with their international commitments’.158 
 
2. The duty to mitigate 
In light of the scale of the projected consequences of climate change, however, mitigation 
efforts are an indispensable part of a viable response. 159 It is the goal of the following 
discussion to take up the present state of the debate on human rights duties with regard to 
climate change and strengthen the case of a human rights law obligation to mitigate. 
 
a) Definition 
As noted before, ‘mitigation’ refers to measures that ‘minimize the extent of global warming 
by reducing emission levels and stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere’.160 A duty to mitigate could hence require states on a general level to enact a 
scheme that limits overall emissions under their control, such as cap-and-trade programs, 
carbon taxes and/or regulations on specific processes and products to limit the related amount 
of emissions.161 With regard to specific projects, states could be obliged to stop polluting state 
activities. Moreover, they could be required to refrain from supporting emission intensive 
 
154 UNEP Climate Change and Human Rights (2015) at 20; see already OHCHR op cit note 16 para 73-4. 
155 ECtHR Budayeva v. Russia (20 March 2008) para 160; see OHCHR op cit note 16 para 74. 
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projects, for instance new coal plants, oil drilling and airports, or even deny necessary permits 
(for building or operation).162 
 
b) Justification: Duties to respect and to protect 
The question then is: Does human rights law impose on states a duty to mitigate? Such an 
obligation could arise under any of the impacted human rights described above as they are all 
impaired by climate change. With regard to each of these rights, states are under a general 
duty to respect, protect and fulfil it. The ICESCR-Committee in its General Comment on the 
right to the highest attainable standard of health has described this tripartite duty as follows: 
‘The obligation to respect requires States to refrain from interfering directly 
or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to health. The obligation to 
protect requires States to take measures that prevent third parties from 
interfering with article 12 guarantees. Finally, the obligation to fulfil 
requires States to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, 
judicial, promotional and other measures towards the full realization of the 
right to health.’163 
While this differentiation was developed mostly with a view to cultural, social and economic 
rights, it is also applicable to political and civil rights164 and is now by and large regarded as 
relevant to all human rights guarantees.165 
 
The duties to respect and to protect present themselves as possible foundations. This is 
because both duties are concerned with prohibiting potentially harmful behaviour, such as 
emitting GHG. 
 
(1) Duty to respect 
As mentioned, the duty to respect enjoins the state to ‘refrain from interfering directly or 
indirectly with the enjoyment’ of human rights.166 If state activities that cause greenhouse 
gases can be seen to interfere with human rights guarantees a duty to reduce these actions can 
be envisioned as part of a duty to mitigate. This would be the case for state activity that 
produces emissions itself, such as state-owned enterprises or military manoeuvres, but also 
 
162 Wewerinke-Singh op cit note 96 at 100.  
163 ICESCR-Committee GC 14 para 33 (emphasis added). 
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state activity that enables emissions, such as subsidies and permissions for GHG intensive 
industries like oil-drilling or airports.167 
 
(2) Duty to protect 
Of course, the impact of these singular actions is small in comparison to the overall emissions 
from a state’s territory. More often than not, state organs themselves will not be responsible 
for most greenhouse gases but rather private parties, especially large corporations.168 For 
these cases, a duty to mitigate can be construed under the duty to protect which ‘requires 
States to take measures that prevent third parties from interfering’ with human rights.169As 
this duty to protect is vested directly in the state organs as their own responsibility, it is not 
necessary that the dangerous private conduct is attributable to the state under Art. 8-11 of the 
ILC Articles on state responsibility.170 
 
3. The problem of Causation and attribution 
There is a crucial problem in both cases, however: The question of causation and attribution. 
Applying the often-cited definitions of the ICESCR Committee the problem can be located in 
the word ‘interfere’. When do GHG-emitting activities by state or private actors indeed 
‘interfere’ with human rights? 
 
a) The problem of causation 
For many commentators, this seems to require a link between emissions and climate change 
impacts: Only if emitting activities by states or by private persons can be seen to indeed cause 
the described negative human rights impacts, would the activity constitute an interference that 
the state has a duty to refrain from (duty to respect) or to restrict (duty to protect).171 This is 
the point where many commentators see the biggest problem in establishing a duty to take 
specific action with regard to climate change172 and a duty to mitigate in particular.173 The 
OHCHR described the problem as follows: 
 
167 Wewerinke-Singh op cit note 96 at 100. 
168 S Klinsky & J Brankovic The Global Climate Regime and Transitional Justice (2018) at 162.  
169 ICESCR-Committee GC 14 para 33. 
170 Similar L Lavrysen who stresses that the liability is constructed by determining the ‘sanctioned conduct’ of 
the state, ‘Causation and Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2018) 18 
Human Rights Law Review at 712.  
171 See Hall & Weiss op cit note 60 at 350 (‘Causation is generally a mandatory element of establishing liability; 
under human rights law, a party needs to be shown to have caused the harm to be held liable for the remedy’). 
172 For example OHCHR op cit note 16 para 96; Atapattu op cit note 53 at 257 (talking about state 
responsibility); Quirico op cit note 111 at 187. 




‘[I]t is virtually impossible to disentangle the complex causal relationships 
linking historical greenhouse gas emissions of a particular country with a 
specific climate change-related effect, let alone with the range of direct and 
indirect implications for human rights.’174 
Similarly, while the reasoning for the rejection of the Inuit Petition did not refer to causation 
and only said that ‘the information provided does not enable [the IACHR] to determine 
whether the alleged facts would tend to characterize a violation of rights protected by the 
American Declaration [the ADRDM]’,175 numerous observers interpreted this to imply the 
lack of a causal link between the GHGs and the alleged human rights infringements.176 
 
The United States District Court in Kivalina rejected a civil litigation177 because the plaintiffs 
could not demonstrate the causation necessary for standing under Art. 3 US Constitution, the 
standard of which is ‘a fairly traceable connection between the alleged injury in fact and the 
alleged conduct of the defendant’ (emphasis omitted).178 It noted that 
‘there is no realistic possibility of tracing any particular alleged effect of 
global warming to any particular emissions by any specific person, entity, 
group at any particular point in time.’179 
 
b) The causation chain of climate change impacts 
To clarify the problem, it is helpful to briefly visualize the causation chain between the 
impugned state conduct (emitting GHG or allowing this) and the human rights impacts 
described earlier.  In a simplified scheme, the causation chain can be seen to consist of four 
events, connected by a total of three links: The starting point is an activity or omission by a 
state that causes or allows GHG-emission (Event1). The second event is global warming 
(Event2). Between these two must be a causal link, which means that the emitting activity 
must have caused global warming (Link1). The third event is an effect of climate change, for 
example an extreme weather event like a heat wave (Event3). This effect must be causally 
 
174 OHCHR op cit note 16 para 70. 
175 IACmHR Petition No. P-1413-05 (‘Inuit Petition’, 16 November 2006, available at 
http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-
documents/2006/20061116_na_decision.pdf). 
176 Quirico op cit note 109 at 190. 
177 Although the case was a civil lawsuit, it is possible to apply the considerations on causation to the present 
question of human rights responsibility.  
178 United States District Court for the Northern District of California Kivalina v Exxonmobil (30 September 
2009) at 15 




linked to climate change, which means that climate change has caused said heat wave 
(Link2). Ultimately, there is an impact on a human right, for example a person loses their life 
(Event4). This impact must be linkable to the extreme weather event; in our example: the 






In order for the GHG-activity to cause a human rights impact, Links 1-3 have to be satisfied. 
The last of these links (Link3) will often be the easiest to prove: Physicians are usually able to 
determine that a person died because of an extreme weather event, like a heat-wave or more 
so a hurricane. This is the most important reason why duties to adapt, as explained, are much 
more established already. In case a state fails to take a specific adaptation measure, it is 
generally possible to prove whether the measure would have prevented the harm to a human 
right and the omission hence caused it. In that case, the duty to fulfil does not depend on a 
government’s responsibility for that threat. As Hall & Weiss put it: ‘That a government did 
not cause a particular harm is not an excuse for its failure to act in the face of it.’180 Questions 
of causality and attribution which are often regarded as the crux of climate change human 
rights litigation are therefore much easier to solve.181 Instead of having to prove that state 
 
180 Hall & Weiss op cit note 60 at 346; see also Knox op cit note 3 at 171 (‘Human rights bodies have made clear 
that states should protect against foreseeable environmental impairment of human rights, whether or not the 
environmental harm itself violates human rights law, and whether or not the states directly cause the harm’). 





















death of a 
person





(in)action lead to climate change which then lead to a specific impairment of a human right, 
claimants only have to prove that there was a threat and that its realisation could have been 
forestalled by adequate state action. In comparison to causality in the context of a duty to 
mitigate, a duty to adapt is located at a much later point within the causality chain, only after 
the most problematic causal links. 
 
As the duty to mitigate, on the other hand, would be located much earlier on the causation 
chain claimants have to prove all three links. On first sight, Link1 should not present an 
insurmountable hurdle. There is now sufficient consensus among scientists that anthropogenic 
emissions are the cause of the current global warming.182 Moreover, emitted greenhouse gases 
mix very well globally once they reach the atmosphere.183 The relationship between 
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and global warming is a rather linear 
one. It can hence be assumed that every emission from any state will (sooner or later) 
contribute to climate change.184 The consideration that other sources also contribute to global 
warming does not change this fact. 
 
The problem of causation is more pronounced already in Link2: connecting a ‘specific 
climate change-related effect’, for example an extreme weather event to anthropogenic 
climate change in general. While there is no doubt that anthropogenic global warming 
increases both the frequency and severity of extreme weather events in general, it is hard to 
say with certainty that a specific, singular nature event was caused or only aggravated by 
anthropogenic climate change. Yet, thanks to scientific progress and especially the emerging 
science of probalistic event attribution, it might soon be possible to furnish this kind of 
evidence.185 Already in 2017, scientists were convinced that certain extreme weather events 
‘could not have happened due to natural climate variability alone’.186 In this case, one could 
hence actually establish that anthropogenic climate change did cause a certain harmful effect. 
 
Yet, the problem becomes by all means unsolvable if one combines Link1 and Link2. To 
attribute a certain harmful effect to one particular state, one has to prove the ‘complex causal 
 
182 S Maljean-Dubois ‘Climate Change Litigation’ in R Wolfrum (ed) MPEIL (2018) para 2. 
183 J Peel ‘Climate Change’ in A Nollkaemper & I Plakokefalos The Practice of Shared Responsibility in 
Internatinal Law (2017) at 1009-10. 
184 Whether the emission becomes causal for a specific climate change effect like a particular extreme weather 
event is another question, see infra.  
185 Minnerop op cit note 58 para 45. 





relationships linking historical greenhouse gas emissions of a particular country with a 
specific climate change-related effect’. In this view, it is not enough to prove the causal link 
between a state’s emission and climate change (Link1) on one hand and between climate 
change and an individual event on the other hand (Link2) separately (an aspect that the 
simplified graphic admittedly does not represent in full). Instead, one would have to prove 
both links taken together.187 Effectively, claimants would be required to trace for example the 
CO2 molecules of the respondent state and examine how they interact with radiation, lead to 
climate change and then somehow to a specific heat wave – an evidently futile exercise. 
 
In the words of Verheyen, it is possible to proof ‘general causation … that anthropogenic 
emissions cause changes in radiative forcing and thus the global climate.’ It is (at least 
currently) not possible, however, to proof ‘specific causation … that a particular impact or 
injury is attributable to (particular) anthropogenic emissions or to the global warming caused 
by them.’188 So far, this problem has not been resolved satisfyingly.  
 
This may partly be due to the incidental role that questions of causation have played in 
international human rights law.189 Even in cases where courts confirmed a violation of human 
rights guarantees because of a failure to mitigate, the question of causation was not dealt with 
explicitly: Although the Dutch Hoge Raad (the Supreme Court in the Dutch judicial system) 
in Urgenda v Netherlands recently became the first court to find a human rights duty to 
mitigate, it did not discuss the described issue of causation head-on.190 
 
To overcome this issue, I will propose and try to justify the following conception of human 
rights obligations: Human rights law does not only require states to refrain and to keep private 
actors from causing actual harm. Instead, they can in certain cases be obligated to prevent and 
reduce the mere risk of harm.191 Although the Hoge Raad did not elaborate this approach, it 
can be argued that it indeed also departed from this assumption as the judgement frequently 
refers to the ‘risk’, ‘danger’, or ‘thread’ of climate change.192  
 
 
187 Lewis op cit note 94 at 219: ‘[T]racing the causal connection between emitters and victims’.  
188 Veryheyen Climate Change Damage and International Law (2005) at 257. 
189 V Stoyanova ‘Causation between State Omission and Harm within the Framework of Positive Obligations 
under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2018) 18 Human Rights Law Review at 309. 
190 Hoge Raad Netherlands v Urgenda (20 December 2019, ‘Urgenda’), see especially paras 5.2.2 and 5.3.2. 
191 Conversely, if they fail to do so or aggravate the risk, this would be an ‘interference’ prohibited under the 
duty to respect and to protect. 




4. Overcoming the problem of causation: An obligation to prevent and reduce risk 
So far, the focus in the discussion on state responsibility has mostly been on attribution of 
specific harmful effects of climate change to specific states and on the question if victims 
have a claim to damages.193 This requires ‘specific causation’,194 for example: ‘But for the 
emissions by State X, would the particular heat wave have killed claimant C?’ As stated 
before, this test can hardly ever be satisfied. 
 
a) Distinguishing obligations from remedies 
Arguably, this focus on harm and damages has narrowed the discussion and obscured the 
potential for a human rights law claim to mitigation. This occurred due to a conflation of the 
question which obligations a state has, and the separate question which consequences follow 
from a breach of these obligations. The question around a duty to mitigate is not if a state has 
to pay compensation for climate change damages. Rather, the question is if a state is required 
to avert climate change damages by reducing emissions. In this context, it is important to note 
that the remedy of a human rights claim does not have to consist in damages or restitution but 
can also be mere cessation of the wrongful conduct or a declaration of unlawfulness.195 
Accordingly, ‘[t]he right to a remedy exists not only ex post facto but also when there is a 
threat of a violation.’196 It is necessary to detach the question which obligations a state has 
from the question which consequences arise from a breach, for example if an injured person 
can claim damages.197 If this distinction between obligation and remedy is made, it becomes 
clear that the content of human rights obligations is indeed broader than is sometimes 
assumed. 
 
b) Obligations to prevent and reduce risks 
On this basis, the following discussion will seek to establish the following argument to 
overcome the problem of causation: Human rights guarantees are not only infringed if state 
 
193 OHCHR op cit note 16; Hall & Weiss op cit note 60 at 350 (‘Causation is generally a mandatory element of 
establishing liability; under human rights law, a party needs to be shown to have caused the harm to be held 
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particular State’, emphasis added); M Faure & A Nollkaemper ‘International Liability’ (2007) 43 Stanford 
Jounral of International Law at 157-8. 
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195 G Turton ‘Causation and Risk in Negligence and Human Rights Law’ (2020) 79 Cambridge Law Journal at 
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affording compensatory damages’). 
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(in)action causes actual damage, but already if state conduct can be seen to put the right at 
risk or increase existing risks.198 In the context of human rights litigation, damage must not 
necessarily have occurred for a claim.199 Admittedly, there is not yet a ‘coherent doctrine of 
risk prevention’200 that could be relied on. However, there is substantive support for an 
obligation on states to reduce risks in human rights case law which, moreover, is in line with 
fundamental principles of human rights law and climate change law. 
 
(1) Jurisprudence and treaty body work 
The duty to prevent risks is especially clear with regard to the right to life. As Trechsel put it: 
‘Once life is lost, what does there remain to protect?’201 In order to protect the right 
effectively, state obligations cannot only arise once the damage is done but need to prevent 
already the mere risk of a violation – a consideration that has already been confirmed in the 
case law of the ECtHR on positive duties.202 
 
In the case of Benzer v Turkey, for example, the Court found that the wounding of the 
(surviving) applicants in a bombing attack constitutes a violation of the right of life under 
Art. 2 ECHR in its ‘substantive aspect’, because the attack ‘which caused these three 
applicants’ injuries, was so violent and caused the indiscriminate deaths of so many people 
that these three applicants’ fortuitous survival does not mean that their lives had not been put 
at risk.’203 In Makaratzis, the ECtHR found a violation of the right to life, not because the 
claimant had died (he survived) but for the fact that the ‘Greek authorities had not, at the 
relevant time, done all that could be reasonably expected of them to afford to citizens … the 
level of safeguards required and to avoid real and immediate risk to life which they knew was 
liable to arise’.204 These examples show that a mere risk is enough to trigger state obligations. 
It is fair to conclude that ‘the Court’s jurisprudence is not necessarily restricted to cases where 
 
198 In relation to ECtHR-jurisprudence: Turton op cit note 195 at 156 (although her assessment differs for cases 
in the healthcare context, see ibid at 172-5). 
199 Ibid at 150-1. 
200 F Ebert & R Sijniensky ‘Preventing Violations of the Right to Life in the European and the Inter-American 
Human Rights Law System’ (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review at 368 (referring to the European human 
rights system). 
201 Quoted after ibid at 343. 
202 While positive duties in the ECHR relate mostly to the duty to protect and fulfil in the above-described 
system of the ICESCR-Committee, they can also have impacts for the duty to respect: Stoyanova op cit note 189 
at 322. 
203 ECtHR Benzer v Turkey (12 November 2013) paras 143, 185 (emphasis added). 




the material harm has manifested itself but also to situations where there is a risk of exposure 
to such harm.’205 
 
This finding alone, however, is not enough to support a duty to mitigate climate change. A 
second crucial question is what the content of that obligation is. More specifically: Are states 
required only to ‘avoid’ risks or also to ‘reduce’ them? This is important because, as 
individual states are only responsible for a fraction of total GHG-emissions, no single state 
can by itself ‘avoid’ climate change impacts by cutting emissions. It can at most reduce 
impacts. As ‘[a] State will only be held liable for a failure to take effective protective 
measures, not for a failure to take ineffective ones’,206 a duty to mitigate is only justifiable 
under this jurisprudence if states have not only a duty to completely prevent but also to reduce 
risks. 
 
On first sight, this seems doubtful. Especially, the most prominent test for positive duties to 
address risks in Osman v UK seems to require states only to take measures that have a chance 
of avoiding the risk altogether: 
‘[T]he authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence 
of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or 
individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to 
take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, 
might have been expected to avoid that risk.’207 
While here, too, the ECtHR accepts that ‘a real and immediate risk’ is sufficient to trigger a 
state obligation, the required measures must ‘have been expected to avoid that risk’. The word 
‘avoid’ seems to indicate that the claimant must still prove that the demanded state conduct 
would have with ‘reasonable’ certainty kept the risk from materializing, thus effectively 
demanding a causal link to the actual injury, not the risk of such. Notably, the test does not 
say the measures ‘might have been expected to reduce that risk’.208 
 
 
205 O Pedersen ‘The European Court of Human Rights and International Environmental Law’ in J Knox. & R 
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Yet, even the Osman-test requires only that the measures ‘might have been expected to avoid 
that risk’ (emphasis added). This leaves leeway for varying degrees of probability. In the 
context of climate change risks, there will often be a (at least small) chance that, had the state 
reduced its emissions, global warming would have been less pronounced and in turn a specific 
impact less probable or less severe. 
 
Stoyanova moreover constates that ‘[t]he ‘but for’ test, which means that but for the state 
failure the harm would not have happened, has been explicitly rejected by the ECtHR.’209 
This assessment is based on the case of E v UK which concerned the prohibition of torture 
under Art. 3 ECHR: 
‘The test under article 3 however does not require it to be shown that ‘but 
for’ the failing or omission of the public authority ill-treatment would not 
have happened. A failure to take reasonably available measures which 
could have had a real prospect of altering the outcome or mitigating the 
harm is sufficient to engage the responsibility of the state.’210 
This is essentially equal to a duty to reduce risk. Similarly, in Salkhov and Islyamova v 
Ukraine, the court found a violation of Art. 2 holding that ‘[w]hether or not the authorities’ 
efforts could in principle have averted the fatal outcome in the present case is not decisive for 
this conclusion. What matters for the Court is whether they did everything reasonably 
possible in the circumstances, in good faith and in a timely manner, to try to save the first 
applicant’s life.’211 
 
The ruling in E v United Kingdom can further be understood to apply the same standard to a 
violation of Art. 8 ECHR.212 The UK Supreme Court has accordingly interpreted the ECtHR-
jurisprudence to assume violations where ‘loss of a substantial chance of avoiding harm’ has 
occurred.213 Pedersen comes to a similar conclusion, stating that under ECtHR case law 
‘citizens have a right to expect the state to take relevant and proportionate measures to 
minimise any risks causing serious danger to people and the environment’.214 
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210 ECtHR E v UK (26 November 2020) para 99. 
211 ECtHR Salakhov and Islyamova v Ukraine (14 March 2013) para 181. 
212 E v United Kingdom supra note 210 para 105 (‘no separate issues arise’). 
213 Turton op cit note 195 at 148; similar Lavrysen op cit note 170 at 717. 
214 O Pedersen ‘The Janus-Head of Human Rights and Climate Change’ (2011) 80 Nordic Journal of 





The most important case for present purposes, however, is Tatar c Roumanie which dealt with 
the right to privacy and family life under Art. 8 ECHR. The applicants in this case were a 
father and his son who lived close to a gold-mine that used sodium-cyanide. They alleged that 
the use of this chemical threatened their health and had already aggravated the son’s pre-
existing asthma. In spite of the fact that the applicants were unable to indeed prove the causal 
link between the use of the chemicals and the worsening of the asthma,215 the court held that: 
‘It [the Court] assumes nonetheless, that despite the lack of causal 
probability in the present case, the existence of a serious and substantial 
risk to the applicants’ health and well-being imposed on the state the 
positive duty to adopt reasonable and adequate measures capable of 
protecting the rights and interests [of the applicants]’.216 
The Court explicitly states that specific causation between the state omission and the impact 
on the applicant’s health could not be proven. Instead, the risk alone was sufficient to impose 
duties on the state to take protective measures.217 True, the court eventually based its finding 
of a violation of Art. 8 to a significant part on the breach of procedural duties.218 It is fair to 
assume though, that the substantive shortcomings would have been sufficient to find a 
violation: 
‘The terms of operation [for the gold mine] that the Romanian authorities 
imposed in this case proved insufficient to prevent a situation with 
consequences for the environment and the well-being of the population. The 
Court concludes that the Romanian authorities failed in their duty to 
sufficiently evaluate in advance the potential risks of the activity in question 
and to take adequate measures capable to protect the rights of the 
concerned’.219 
However, while the Strasburg Court found a violation of Art. 8 ECHR, it did not see itself in a 
position to award damages: 
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‘With regard to the material prejudice alleged by the second applicant [the 
son with asthma], the Court agrees with the view of the Government that 
there was no causal link between the violation of the Convention and the 
alleged prejudice’.220 
This supports the earlier statement that the question if a state has breached its duty should be 
distinguished from the question if the claimant can demand reparation or restitution for 
damages. 
 
Tatar c Roumanie can be seen as substantial support for the argument made here: Not only 
did the case concern environmental impacts. More importantly, the Court expressly stated that 
the ‘existence of a serious and substantial risk’ was enough to trigger state obligations. 
Although the applicants could not prove that the breach of duty had indeed caused harm or 
that the demanded actions would have even prevented a worsening of the son’s asthma, the 
Romanian government was held responsible for not having taken measures.221 This seems 
very comparable to the problem of causation in climate change cases: In both cases, a private 
actor creates a risk for the well-being of people (risk of asthma / risk of pernicious climate 
change effects). In both cases, it cannot, however, be proven that the behaviour indeed did 
cause the harm (aggravation of asthma / causing a specific climate change impact) – specific 
causation cannot be established. In Tatar, the ECtHR held that a causal link between the 
private behaviour and the specific effect is not required. Instead, the potential causal link or 
general causation was sufficient. There is no apparent reason why causation of risk should not 
be sufficient then with regards to climate change, as well. 
 
So far, this ‘risk-based’ approach to human rights obligations has only been demonstrated 
under the European system. ECtHR case law carries significant authority for the interpretation 
of other human rights treaties, however. This is demonstrated by the fact that the IACtHR has 
adopted the ECtHR approach to positive obligations into its own jurisprudence.222 Moreover, 
already in its very first case, the IACtHR had held that the right to life in Art. 4(1) ACHR and 
Art. 1(1) ACHR 
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‘impl[ies] an obligation on the part of States Parties to take reasonable 
steps to prevent situations that could result in the violation of that right.’223 
Recently, the IACtHR in its Advisory Opinion OC-17/23 on environment and human rights 
stated that 
‘States, taking into account the existing level of risk, must regulate activities 
that could cause significant environmental damage in a way that reduces 
any threat to the rights to life and to personal integrity’.224 
On the international level, the HRC clarified for Art. 6 ICCPR: 
‘The obligation of States parties to respect and ensure the right to life 
extends to reasonably foreseeable threats and life-threatening situations that 
can result in loss of life. States parties may be in violation of article 6 even 
if such threats and situations do not result in loss of life.’225 
What is clear from this quote is that the right to life is not only violated when the state 
conduct indeed led to an impact (loss of life) but also when it led to the risk of loss of life. 
This means that in the context of causation, claimants only have to prove that state conduct 
created a risk to the right to life – an approach that is in line with the general principle that 
Art. 6 ICCPR must not be interpreted narrowly.226 
 
It must be admitted that this compilation of case law and treaty body-work is neither 
exhaustive nor does it represent a ‘coherent doctrine’.227 Yet, it demonstrates that the 
reduction of risk does already exist as an obligation under human rights law. 
 
(2) The principles of effet utile, due diligence and precaution 
This conclusion is further corroborated by three fundamental principles of public international 
law which are of significance also for human rights law: The principles of effet utile, due 
diligence and precaution. 
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The basis of the effet utile-principle can be seen in Art. 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties.228 This norm which stresses a teleological interpretation (‘in the light of 
its [the treaty’s] object and purpose’) is especially important for human rights conventions.229 
It requires that treaties be interpreted in a way that enables ‘effective’ realisation of their 
purposes. In the context of human rights guarantees, foremost but not exclusively the right to 
life, one can argue that effective protection can only be achieved if state obligations intervene 
early and include the prevention of risks which might lead to violations. 
 
As has already been mentioned, the due diligence principle has been employed by the 
IACtHR in relation to risks created by private actors. From the perspective of a state, potential 
pernicious conduct by privates is always no more than a risk because there can be no certainty 
when and where a private actor will violate a human right. This is corroborated by the fact 
that due diligence is generally seen as a duty of conduct, not of result.230 This means that it is 
not necessarily decisive if the state action or omissions did indeed cause the outcome. The 
duty can already be violated if the state did not take appropriate measures. In consequence, 
the mere existence of the due diligence duty indicates that states have an obligation to reduce 
the risk of harm, even if the concrete harm might be uncertain.231 In the context of GHG-
emissions, this is even more true, as there is indeed certainty that the risks will sooner or later 
materialise – the only uncertainty is when and where. 
 
Lastly, the precautionary principle also provides an argument for the prevention of mere 
risks.232 Although there are several formulations of the principle,233 the most prominent 
version can be found in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. It reads: 
‘In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
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shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.’234 
As is evident from the first sentence of this quote, the principal field of application of the 
precautionary principle is environmental protection.235 Despite these roots it has increasingly 
found its way into other areas of law, including human rights issues. In the European context, 
the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) has essentially applied a variant of the precautionary 
principle to human health, holding that ‘[w]here there is uncertainty as to the existence or 
extent of risks to human health, the institutions [of the European Union] may take protective 
measures without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks become fully 
apparent.’236 Relying on this jurisprudence, the ECtHR in Tatar explicitly counted the 
precautionary principle as part of the ‘pertinent international law and practice’237 and used it 
in finding a violation of the right to health as contained in Art. 8(1) ECHR.238 This 
demonstrates that despite its origins in environmental law, the precautionary principle or 
variants thereof can apply to human rights law, at least in the context of environmental 
risks.239 
 
As quoted, the principle requires states not to use ‘lack of full scientific certainty’ as ‘a reason 
for postponing cost-effective measures’ in the face of ‘threats of serious or irreversible 
damage’.240 Applying this to human rights law and climate change, one can argue that states 
should not deny an obligation to mitigate and to reduce risks just because there is no ‘full 
scientific certainty’ as to when and where these risks will materialize and cause actual harm. 
Rather, in light of the possible ‘serious or irreversible damage’ through climate change, they 




The referenced case law, supported by principles of international human rights and 
environmental law, has shown that it is not necessary for a violation of human rights norms 
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that actual damage or loss materializes. While it is too early to speak of ‘a coherent doctrine 
of risk prevention’242, there is substantive support to say that in certain cases states are obliged 
to reduce mere risks. In contrast to Kivalina, it is thus not required to establish the link 
between particular emissions and ‘any particular alleged effect of global warming’. It is 
sufficient to prove that the risk of the effect in question has increased due to the emissions. 
 
To be sure, this does not mean that causation is irrelevant. Only the object of causation has 
shifted: Instead of proving that the state emission or failure to regulate emission caused harm, 
claimants now have to prove that it caused the risk of harm. This is by no means at odds with 
established human rights law. It is merely a more extensive – but justified – interpretation of 
‘the content of human rights obligations’.243 Evidently, it constitutes a significantly lower 
threshold, though. 
 
This lower standard is ‘consistent with the aims of the ECHR [and human rights law in 
general] which are the promotion and protection of human rights standards and the rule of 
law, rather than compensation for damage upon proof of loss’.244 Consequently, there is a 
generic obligation on states to prevent and reduce risks to human rights, by not creating risks 
themselves (duty to respect) and by preventing private actors from creating risks (duty to 
protect). 
 
c) Climate change effects as risks 
Naturally it would be an overexpansion of human rights obligations , though, if every risk 
created or not prevented by a state constituted a violation. Now that it has been established 
that states can in certain circumstances be under a duty to prevent the mere risk of harm, it is 
necessary to enquire whether the risks associated with climate change fall into this category. 
Only if the climate related risks meet certain criteria can there be a duty to prevent or mitigate 
them. 
 
Applying the influential test in Osman, one might doubt if climate change risks can indeed 
meet the requirements. The test is quite restrictive, requiring not only ‘a real and immediate 
risk’ but also ‘to the life of an identified individual or individuals’.245 In the context of climate 
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change this bar might seem difficult to clear. Climate change risks are not always clearly 
‘immediate’ and usually affect a large number of people or even society at large, so that it is 
difficult to identify the victims. However, subsequent case law has relaxed these requirements 
considerably. As the Court in Urgenda notes, an ‘immediate’ risk does not have to occur in ‘a 
short period of time’ but the risk can also only materialize at some point in the future.246  The 
requirement regarding ‘identified individual(s)’ has equally been relaxed so that dangers to 
society at large can also trigger state obligations.247 One can thus argue that climate change 
risks trigger a state duty to prevent or mitigate them. Nevertheless it seems reasonable that 
potential claimants must nonetheless demonstrate concrete risks such as the risk of flooding 
or heatwaves in their area and cannot solely rely on the general, abstract dangers of climate 
change. While the real meaning of ‘real and immediate’ has never been clarified,248 one can 
interpret the word ‘real’ to refer to concrete, not abstract risks.249 This is also relevant for the 
question of standing which only people indeed at risk (for example living in a coastal area that 
is in danger of floods) can have. 
 
In this context, it is further important to keep in mind that the Osman-test and most 
jurisprudence around risks was developed with regard to the right to life, the prohibition of 
torture and the right to privacy (which includes bodily integrity). This implies that the risks in 
question need to be significant. As explained, climate change does indeed have impacts on the 
right to life.250 It does not seem entirely unreasonable, moreover, to transfer this jurisprudence 
to the other rights affected by climate change. Occasionally, the ECtHR and the IACtHR have 
hinted in this direction.251 Many of the rights listed earlier are moreover inextricably linked to 
the right of life and indeed conditions for its enjoyment (rights to the highest attainable 
standard of health, adequate food, water, adequate housing).252 Ultimately, it would be in line 
with the general principles of universality and indivisibility of human rights to, in principle, 
apply the obligation of risk-prevention to all rights (although with certain adjustments based 
on the nature and severity of the risk). In this case, varying degrees of severity and limitations 
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such as progressive realisation could unproblematically be accounted for when determining 
which specific measures are required.253 
 
This assessment is further supported by the fact that the ECtHR has in the past applied the 
Osman-test flexibly and extended the risks that fall under it.254 As many scholars have noted, 
these are not hard requirements. According to Stoyanova  ‘[n]o hard-edged legal tests apply to 
cases invoking positive obligations under the ECHR’255 and the ‘limitative function’ of the 
Osman-test is ‘not of general applicability’.256 To alleviate this vagueness, the literature on 
positive duties under the ECHR has established especially the importance of state knowledge 
and foreseeability to determine state duties.257 
 
According to Lavrysen, state knowledge is a ‘precondition for the existence of positive 
duties’.258 This criterium is definitely fulfilled as regards climate change harms. In light of the 
host of studies describing the risks of climate change and especially the work of the IPCC and 
the UNFCCC, all states can be assumed to have knowledge of the risks of climate change by 
now.259 True enough, the details are in many cases still murky. Yet, in light of the 
precautionary principle, this cannot be an excuse. More importantly, this is not only true for 
climate change in general, but also for the emissions of each state in particular: As mentioned, 
one can be almost sure that each emission will sooner or later contribute to a global warming-
related effect; the only incertitude is when and where. This high certainty is a strong argument 
for a duty to prevent and reduce climate change risks: ‘[T]he more predictable a hazard, the 
greater the obligation to protect against it.’260 
 
In conclusion, thanks to growing scientific research, certain risks for the people in certain 
areas can now be seen as ‘reasonably foreseeable’261 and even ‘real and immediate’. In 
consequence, the (respective)262 state has a duty to prevent and reduce these risks. 
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d) Proving causation between emissions and risks 
As mentioned, this risk-based approach does not entirely remove the requirement of causation 
but merely shift its object. For the duty to mitigate to exist, one must prove causation between 
these risks and the behaviour to be regulated: Emissions of a state (duty to respect) or its 
failure to regulate emissions by private actors (duty to protect). Only if the risks are indeed 
caused or exacerbated by emissions can mitigation efforts be seen as an ‘effective measure’263 
to avoid or reduce these risks. 
 
It is hence necessary to prove that the emissions of a particular state indeed increased the risk 
of a climate change event that constituted the ‘real risk’ to a human right, for example a 
heatwave or a flooding.  According to the above argument it is not necessary, however, to 
prove that mitigation by the state would have eliminated the risk altogether. It is only 
necessary to establish that these ‘measures … could have had a real prospect of altering the 
outcome or mitigating the harm’.264  Put differently, would mitigation efforts by state X 
actually have decreased the probability or severity of the event? 
 
In dealing with this question the benefit of the risk-centred approach to human rights and to a 
duty to mitigate becomes clear: While it is true that due to the countless sources of GHG, a 
specific impact can never be traced to the emissions of a particular state, there can be little 
doubt that they have nonetheless increased the risk of that impact, both regarding its 
probability and scale. Every additional ton of GHG in the atmosphere will interact with 
radiation and thus lead to an ever so slightly increase in global warming. Every increase in 
global temperature, even just a fraction of a degree centigrade, in turn increases the risk of 
negative impacts. As the Dutch Supreme Court put it: ‘each reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions has a positive effect on combating dangerous climate change … no reduction is 
negligible.265 
 
This link is especially clear when it comes to slow onsetting events such as rise of sea-levels 
and the related risk of small island states to become completely submerged.266 Here, the 
relation between global warming, the melting of ice and the consequent rise of median sea-
levels is especially obvious. But also with most other human rights impacts it is fair to assume 
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that every reduction of emissions would mean a reduction of risk by diminishing the 
probability and scale of impacts. It can therefore be concluded that in most instances the 
causality between emissions and risks can be established. 
 
e) Separate and individual vs joint and several liability 
In this context it is important to note that the fact that an individual state will in most cases 
only be responsible for a minimal fraction of total (anthropogenic) GHG emissions limits its 
responsibility in no way.267 This is clear from Art. 47 ILC Articles which assumes that it is 
possible for ‘several states’ to be ‘responsible for the same international wrongful act’. This 
article as part of the general rules of state responsibility has importance for human rights law 
as well.268 The same is true for certain ICJ judgements in which states were found liable, even 
though other states had also played a role in causing the damage.269 
 
A problem arises in relation to the issue of compensation for actual harm.270 Here, the 
claimant would have to prove specific causation between the respondent state’s emissions and 
her damage. Moreover, she can only claim the share of her damage that the state is 
responsible for. If states are liable only separately and individually, the claimant has to prove 
every state’s share of the caused damage and sue accordingly. This renders the causation 
problem even more difficult. In light of this problem, some scholars advocate to apply the 
principle of joint and several liability, whereby a claimant could sue any of the states for the 
full amount and it would be the task of the sued state to get reimbursements from the other 
states for their share.271 If such a principle does indeed exist in international (human rights) 
law is dubious.272 Regardless, this issue around compensation does not change the fact that as 
far as primary responsibility and therefore the duty to mitigate is concerned – each state is 
individually liable to cease emissions that violate human rights. 
 
f) Burden of proof 
A further element that can facilitate a duty to mitigate is an adapted proof requirement. Some 
scholars suggest that in light of the precautionary principle and the principle of effet utile,273 
the burden of proof might be lower for claimants – or even reversed. According to 
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Wewerinke-Singh, ‘[t]his means that even the absence of evidence could sometimes 
substantiate or consolidate a State responsibility claim connected with the human rights 
implications of climate change.274 In this most radical form, the state would ultimately have to 
prove that GHG it emits or permits to be emitted do not cause any relevant damage. Arguably, 
this task is just as impossible as its counterpart and seems too burdensome on states and the 
potential for development. 
 
A mere lowering of the burden of proof, on the other hand, so that claimants only have to 
prove a ‘reasonable degree of certainty’275 (not full certainty) of damage, is very much in line 
with the risk-centred approach which also requires litigants to demonstrate the probability (the 
risk) of damage occurring. 
 
g) Summary 
In conclusion, the issue of causation which is often seen as the Achilles Heel of a duty to 
mitigate under human rights law can indeed be overcome: By focusing on state obligations 
not to create or aggravate risks for human rights and to regulate risk-creating behaviour by 
private actors, one can justify that a general duty to reduce GHG-emissions exists under 
human rights law. Against this backdrop, there is no doubt anymore that every emission of 
GHG contributes to global warming and that every increase in global warming entails greater 
risk to a great number of human rights. Accordingly, states are under a duty to reduce 
emissions (their own and by private actors on their territory) – a duty to mitigate. 
 
5. The content and scope of a duty to mitigate 
So far, however, not much has been said about the specific content of this duty. What 
mitigation efforts exactly can, and must governments make? 
 
Contrary to other threats to human rights and most of the case law discussed above, there is 
not one specific measure a state must or even can take in order to avert the threat. Alone by 
itself, no one singular state can avert the threat. While this, as argued, does not preclude state 
responsibility, it makes determining the precise content of the duty more difficult: Every 
reduction in emissions diminishes the threat to human rights but might at the same time 
restrict other interests. Not only is there, hence, no one clear measure that courts can order but 
determining the mitigation efforts requires a complex, polycentric balancing of highly 
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political issues. In adjudicating cases of a duty to mitigate, courts will have to consider 
restrictions to their powers and limitations within human rights law: International courts have 
to respect a state’s ‘margin of appreciation’,276 while national courts have to consider 
separation of powers and the prerogatives of the legislative and executive branches.277 
 
This is why the court cannot dictate the state what mitigation efforts to take but must rather 
decide whether the government’s policies are sufficient. For this exercise it would be helpful 
to first establish the general standard which state mitigation efforts must meet. 
 
a) Standard of ‘reasonableness’ 
As mentioned, every ton of GHG-emissions increases the risk of harmful climate change 
impacts. Clearly, states cannot be required to stall all emissions, though. The ECtHR held that 
positive duties as referred above must be interpreted ‘not to impose an excessive burden on 
the authorities’.278 Instead, the ECtHR has frequently confirmed that states must take only 
measures that are ‘adequate and reasonable’279 or must do ‘all that could be reasonably 
expected of’ them.280 
 
This standard of ‘reasonableness’ is an important tool for the ECtHR to delimit the scope of 
positive obligations.281 In doing so, it includes various aspects in its assessment: ‘When the 
Court refers to reasonableness in the context of positive obligations, it has in mind public 
interests – including public policy considerations, budgetary concerns and the rights of others 
– as factors that might compete with the assistance and protection of interests of the particular 
applicant.’282 It is therefore fair to say that the reasonableness-test is essentially an exercise in 
balancing rights, interests and resources as is common in all human rights legal systems.283 
This is important because the above-mentioned standard has been developed with regard to 
the right of life and therefore goes quite far (‘all that could be reasonably expected’). If the 
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duty to prevent risk is to be applied to other rights with less pronounced status, this might be 
excessive. In seeing the ‘reasonableness’-test as a form of balancing-exercise, it is possible to 
account for the possibly different ‘statuses’ of rights or limitations such as progressive 
realisation.284 Moreover, this standard might also allow to incorporate questions of climate 
justice, for example by considering the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
(“CBDR”) as enshrined in the major climate change agreements.285  
 
An advantage of this approach certainly is its flexibility; a disadvantage is its vagueness. It 
can nonetheless be operationalised. As Savaresi noted: 
‘While states generally enjoy a certain discretion to strike a balance 
between legitimate societal interests, Special Rapporteur Knox has pointed 
out that the balance struck cannot be “unreasonable or result in unjustified, 
foreseeable infringements of human rights”.’286 
The court in Urgenda equally held that courts ‘may determine whether the measures taken by 
a state are ‘reasonable and suitable’ or ‘too little’.287 It is important to note, however, that 
courts must not replace the result of the balancing exercise by the state with their own 
decision but can only decide whether the government’s finding is (still) tenable or not. In 
consequence, courts may only strike down policies which manifestly cannot be justified as a 
reasonable balance. 
 
It appears possible to apply this test to individual state decisions regarding particular projects 
or programs, as well as to the general policy regarding overall emissions. This can help to 
clarify the duty to mitigate and make its content more concrete. 
 
b) Individual projects and programs 
In relation to individual state projects and programs, this standard of reasonableness can 
require the government to refrain from a project (duty to respect) or, in the case of a private 
project, to prohibit it (duty to protect). This can lead to a procedural as well as substantive 
obligations. 
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A substantive obligation would for example comprise a duty to cancel ‘unreasonably’ GHG-
intensive projects altogether, for example to stop subsidies or not grant permits.288 This seems 
difficult with regard to state discretion and principles of separation of power. While 
prescribing a certain goal of reduction leaves the state the freedom to decide how to 
accomplish this goal, a duty to abandon or prohibit a specific project leaves very little room 
for policy decisions. It does not seem impossible, however, that courts could strike down 
projects whose GHG-output is evidently and grossly out of balance to expected benefits.289 
Courts could also require certain measures that can “reasonably” be expected to combat 
climate change. The Colombian Supreme Court, for example, in Generaciones Futuras v 
Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible ordered the Colombian government to adopt a 
plan against deforestation.290 
 
As regards individual projects, the duty to mitigate might nonetheless be more effective in the 
form of a procedural obligation. Under such an obligation the state will have to assess the 
GHG-emissions not necessarily of all, but of major projects and compare their impact on 
global warming to the expected benefits. It is a well-established instrument of international 
environmental law that states have to conduct general environmental impact assessments 
(‘EIA’) of planned projects. The obligation is acknowledged for example in the Rio-
Declaration291 and has been affirmed by the ICJ as a ‘requirement under general international 
law’ in relations between states.292 Albeit, the focus of EIAs has traditionally been elements 
that are more immediately harmful than GHG. While the possibility of applying this 
instrument to GHG emissions as well as potential benefits have already been outlined,293 this 
practice is not yet broadly implemented.294 Moreover, it has not been acknowledged as a duty 
under human rights law.295 As part of the duty to mitigate as discussed here, the pressure 
would rise on states to conduct EIAs of ‘activities that are likely to have significant GHG 
impacts – such as programmatic decisions about fossil fuel development, large fossil fuel-
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fired power plants, and fuel economy standards’.296 This duty of conduct would not only 
facilitate mitigation but also establish standing for claimants whose rights are infringed when 
the government neglects to execute an EIA. 
 
That procedural duties might be more adequate and effective than substantive obligations with 
regard to specific projects is also evidenced by the recent decision of the UK Court of Appeal 
in R v Secretary of State of Transport. While the court was hesitant to decide on the 
permissibility of a third airport-runway and related emissions, it stopped the project because 
the state had not taken into account the Paris Agreement.297 Admittedly, the case concerned 
statutory, rather than human rights duties, but it does show the value of a procedural 
obligation as proposed here. 
 
c) Reduction of overall emissions 
More important is the effect of the duty to mitigate with regard to the total GHG-emissions by 
a state. Obviously, this aspect is more consequential by far than any singular project. 
The crucial question is if it is possible to determine the goal that mitigation efforts must 
attain. In other words: Which degree of emission reduction is ‘reasonable’ to expect from the 
state? Is it possible to establish a certain percentage of reduction?298 
 
Evidently, this question confronts courts with major challenges due to the myriad elements 
that have to be considered in this decision. Unproblematic in this regard, however, are mostly 
procedural obligations. While courts may not be in a position to ascertain which degree of 
reduction constitutes a reasonable balance, it is evident that complete inaction by the 
government cannot be in accordance with the duty to mitigate. At the very least, the duty to 
mitigate compels governments to enact a climate protection plan that seriously takes the 
human rights impacts into account and considers obvious possible measures.299 
 
To establish the substantive obligation of a specific reduction objective, on the other hand, is 
more challenging. While it seems permissible for courts to strike down at least ‘manifestly 
unreasonable’ reduction programs, it is still difficult to ascertain where the applicable 
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threshold lies. Albeit, one aspect could make this task easier: If the state has already adopted a 
system to reduce emissions, there is a strong indication that these regulations cannot 
constitute an ‘undue burden’ on the state and can be seen as a ‘reasonable balance’. In this 
case, human rights litigants can demand that the state comply with its own regulations to 
discharge its duty to mitigate. From the vantage point of the courts, the intrusion on state 
sovereignty or executive prerogative is comparatively limited, as the court does little more 
than implement a decision already taken by the government. This thought is mirrored in the 
ECtHR- and IACtHR-jurisprudence who, mostly in environmental cases, have often found a 
violation of human rights if the respondent state did not comply with its own laws.300 The 
duty to mitigate would therefore accord a right to claimants to have state climate protection 
plans implemented. 
 
An important question is this context is to what extent this consideration can be applied to 
international obligations, including soft, non-binding instruments – most importantly the 
NDCs under the Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement itself only requires states to ‘pursue 
domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of’ their NDCs.301 
While the treaty itself thus only presents a rather weak obligation of conduct,302 a human 
rights duty to mitigate could ‘charge’ these obligations with binding power and force states to 
indeed achieve the goals of their NDCs.303 Arguably, if a state declares or commits to a 
certain reduction, it cannot claim afterwards that this goal is ‘unreasonable’, regardless if the 
declared goal is in and of itself binding or not.304 
 
This seems to have been the approach of the Hoge Raag in Urgenda as well: Reviewing a 
large number of (partly non-binding) international documents dealing with climate change 
mitigation, it concluded that ‘there is a high degree of international consensus on the urgent 
need for the Annex I countries [in the UNFCCC] to reduce greenhouse emissions by at least 
25-40% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels’ and that this ‘must be taken into account when 
interpreting and applying the ECHR.’305 The Court explicitly found that the non-binding 
nature of some of the instruments is not an obstacle.306 Consequently, it held that the Dutch 
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state failed its duties under Art. 2 and 8 ECHR by adopting a policy which aimed for a 
reduction of only 20%, not 25%, by 2020.307 
 
However, even if all NDCs were fully implemented, the often-invoked goal to keep global 
warming to 2 or even 1,5°C compared to pre-industrial times would be missed.308 According 
to best scientific knowledge as well as international agreements, this is the threshold where 
the most severe climate change impacts, including on human rights, can be averted. The goal 
of 2°C has recently been established as the binding goal of the Paris Agreement (Art. 2(a)) 
which could be seen as a (rather authentic) specification of the more general target in Art. 2 
UNFCCC. In order to be effective in protecting human rights the duty to mitigate would 
hence have to go beyond what is already required of states under climate protection 
agreements. 
 
The task is to translate and apply this global goal to individual state responsibilities. This 
might be possible on the basis of the concept of a GHG budget.309 The GHG-budget describes 
how many tons of GHG the whole of the global community can still emit without foiling the  
2°C-goal (calculations for the 1,5°C-goal are not yet available).310 Under a strictly egalitarian 
approach it is possible to allocate to each state its individual GHG-budget by dividing the  
global budget by the total population and then multiplying each state’s population with the 
permissible per capita emissions. As the goal is to stop emissions of GHG by 2100,311 each 
state would have to make sure that its personal budget ‘lasts’ until then. As the current 
emissions per annum of most states would lead to overshooting of their respective budgets, 
one can establish ‘reduction paths’ which by gradual reduction would lead to emissions 
within the budget. 312 This would make it possible to ascertain at least minimum reduction 
targets for certain dates in time. 
 
Admittedly, this concept is not without weaknesses. First of all, the climate budget shows 
what is required to largely prevent the risk of harmful climate change. It does not take account 
of the other factors described above, which the reduction obligation needs to be balanced 
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against, such as limited state resources or development. This problem is alleviated, however, 
if the climate budget is merely taken as starting point. It would still be possible for the state to 
plead certain circumstances that require a lower reduction target.313 
 
More difficult is a second concern: The GHG-budget as just described evidently ignores 
difficult questions of historic emissions and climate justice as described above. Certainly, it 
would be possible to allocate the GHG-budget differently. In particular one could work out a 
‘historic’ GHG-budget which considers the total GHG-budget from the beginning of the 
industrialisation.314 In this scenario, many developed countries would already have used up 
their entire budget and a larger share of the remaining emissions would fall to developing 
countries.315 Yet, which budget-approach to take (future budget or historic budget) is clearly a 
question of fairness and international politics and difficult to answer by courts. The principle 
of common but shared responsibilities is not concrete enough by far to provide sufficient 
guidance in this matter.316 Nonetheless, it would be possible to formulate minimum 
requirements to both developed and developing states by applying the more favourable 
standard respectively: Developed states are required to achieve reduction as required by their 
current future GHG-budget, while developing states only have to achieve reduction in 
accordance with a historic calculation of the global GHG-budget. Effectively, this would 
mean applying the most favourable calculation to either side. Evidently, in total this would 
not lead to a sufficient reduction. It might nonetheless a basis for legally enforceable and 
concrete (minimum) reduction targets. 
 
6. Summary: Duty to mitigate 
In sum, there are good reasons to argue that a duty to mitigate climate change does indeed 
exist under human rights law. The various impacts of global warming on virtually all human 
rights are now beyond contestation. While no single impact can be traced to a particular 
emission of a particular state, this is not necessary to trigger the duty to mitigate. There is 
strong evidence in regional but also international human rights law that states not only have to 
prevent actual harm but under certain circumstances also to reduce the mere risk of harms. 
Every emission of GHG increases the risk of grave and very foreseeable climate change 
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impacts to human rights. If states neglect to mitigate their own and private emissions, this can 
therefore constitute an ‘interference’ with the human rights guarantees which violates the duty 
to respect or duty to protect respectively. 
 
Equally difficult as justifying the duty to mitigate is determining its exact content and scope, 
however. As this requires a complex balancing exercise, courts have to respect the national 
governments and legislatives prerogative to determine the nature and scale of their efforts. 
However, the duty to mitigate is not entirely vague: The government is obliged to find a 
‘reasonable balance’ between climate protection and other interests. Both international and 
national courts can examine at least roughly if adopted policies can be seen to meet this 
standard and strike down policies which are manifestly unbalanced. Besides failure to comply 
with certain procedural requirements, this will especially be the case where governments fail 
to comply with their own objectives. Arguably this includes non-binding declarations, 
including NDCs under the Paris Agreement. The human rights duty to mitigate thereby 
effectively ‘charges’ certain soft law norms of climate protection agreements with binding 
power. Indeed, the duty to mitigate under human rights law can even be seen to go beyond the 
requirements of climate protection law: There is broad consensus that, to prevent the most 
severe human rights impacts, it is essential to keep global warming below 2, better 1,5 °C. 
Individual governments have to ‘do their share’ in attaining this goal by not overspending on 
their respective climate budget. In light of the scale of human rights threats, this effort can 
often be seen as the ‘absolute minimum’ which the duty to mitigate requires states to do. 
V. Climate justice and extraterritoriality 
 
So far, climate change obligations and the duty to mitigate have been discussed to some 
extent as if it was a mere national human rights issue, not the global challenge that it is.317 
This ignores the different vulnerability to climate change and adaptive capacities of states as 
described earlier.318 
 
1. Relevance: The risk of ‘adaptation apartheid’ 
On first sight this might not seem like much of an issue. After all, a duty to mitigate would 
never only benefit the own population. As Quirico points out, a duty to mitigate would ‘de 
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facto … have beneficial extraterritorial effects’, even if it is only justified nationally, ‘because 
of the global common nature of the atmosphere’.319 
 
Nonetheless, an extraterritorial perspective on the duty to mitigate is necessary to safeguard 
its potential for climate justice. This is due to two considerations: First, the case for a duty to 
mitigate would be much stronger if states had to consider the impacts of climate change 
around the world, not only within their own territory. This is especially true for developed 
countries in the global north for which the impact of climate change might all in all be 
tolerable and the 2°C-goal perhaps not mandatory to avert serious harm to the population.  
 
More importantly, an extraterritorial application of human rights would shift the relation 
between adaptation and mitigation efforts: For an individual state trying to protect only its 
own population, adaptation measures will often be more (cost-)effective than mitigation. For 
example, if a (developed) state reduces emissions this will likely slow down its economic 
development.320 This action by itself, however, does not affect climate change significantly 
and the benefit for the own population will be indirect and minimal. On the other hand, if a 
state instead invests in adaptation measures this might indeed have a positive effect on its 
economy321 and will benefit the own population directly and palpably. From a national point 
of view, developed states in particular might therefore use their discretion with relation to 
their human rights duties exclusively for adaptation, shielding their own population from 
climate change. A mere territorial viewpoint could thus aggravate the already existing 
differences which some scholars even equate with a crime against humanity, calling it 
‘adaptation apartheid’.322 
 
2. Overcoming ‘adaptation apartheid’ 
Human rights, by their nature, are supposed to protect the most vulnerable and diminish 
inequalities, not reinforce them. There must accordingly be a way to interpret the duties in a 
way that protects rights all over the globe, avoids ‘adaptation apartheid’ and supports climate 
justice. Two related but distinguishable possibilities present themselves: First, one could 
interpret the relevant human rights treaties to include rights for people outside a state’s own 
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territory. Secondly, one could correlate the duty to mitigate with duties to cooperate 
internationally.323 
 
a) Applying human rights extraterritorially 
The first line of thought would be to find arguments and interpretations that do allow for an 
extraterritorial duty under human rights treaties – a very contentious issue.324 Moreover, the 
fragmentation of human rights law again becomes evident: Not only is the problem addressed 
slightly different in each instrument, there are also differences between groups of rights, in 
particular between civil and political rights on one hand and economic, social and cultural 
rights on the other hand.325 
 
(1) The rule: The requirement of ‘jurisdiction’ 
Despite the differences between different instruments, the extraterritorial effect of human 
rights obligations largely depends on the question if a state can be seen to exercise 
‘jurisdiction’ over the person affected.326 Most prominently, Art. 2(1) ICCPR limits the 
application of the Covenant as follows: 
‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.’327 
Patently, in order to give rise to obligations on a state, a right under the ICCPR has to be 
threatened ‘within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’. Similar limitations can be found 
in the the ECHR328 and the ACHR.329 The ACHPR on the other hand does not contain such a 
limitation but holds generally that member states have to ‘recognize the rights’ in the 
Charter330 and that ‘[e]very individual shall be entitled’ to them.331 
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The problem with the limitation clause in Art. 2(1) ICCPR becomes slightly smaller in light 
of ICJ jurisprudence which applies a disjunctive reading to the central ‘within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction’, effectively reading the phrase as ‘within its territory or subject to 
its jurisdiction.332 An extraterritorial application is thus possible if the state exercises 
‘jurisdiction’. 
 
This vantage point is in line with the classical conception of human rights law which is 
conceptually ‘vertical’ in nature.333 Traditionally, human rights apply between the state and its 
subjects. A ‘diagonal’ application, that is obligations between a state and another state’s 
subjects, is a quite novel idea.334 In light of this basic conception, one might argue to apply 
these standards also to treaties that do not include a territoriality provision of their own. This 
applies especially to the ICESCR. The ICESCR does not contain a territoriality or 
jurisdiction-clause.335 Still, many scholars assume that generally the same principles apply as 
in the case of the ICCPR.336 This seems plausible, especially in light of Art. 2 of the Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR which allows communications that arise ‘under the jurisdiction of a 
State party’ with regards to a violation ‘by that State party’ (emphasis added).337 The central 
question for the extraterritorial application of human rights norms – including in the context 
of climate change – hence is if the state executed ‘jurisdiction’. Importantly, the state has to 
exercise jurisdiction over the affected individuals, not the causes of the harm which severely 
limits the cases of application.338 
 
Albeit, the standard to establish ‘jurisdiction’ is neither uniform nor clear. A quite restrictive 
approach is adopted by the ECtHR which in its often-criticised339 decision Banković v 
Belgium denied violations of the ECHR due to bombings in the former Republic of 
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Yugoslavia.340 The case for extraterritorial application in environment and climate change 
cases should not be better: ‘If dropping bombs on a city does not amount to effective control 
of its occupants, allowing pollution to move across an international border almost certainly 
would not.’341 Although the ECtHR slightly relaxed this standard in later case law,342 GHG-
emissions should still fall short of establishing ‘jurisdiction’. 
 
The approach of the IACtHR is noticeably broader: In its landmark 2017 advisory opinion 
OC-17/23 on the environment and human rights, it stated explicitly that: 
‘When transboundary harm or damage occurs, a person is under the 
jurisdiction of the State of origin if there is a causal link between the action 
that occurred within its territory and the negative impact on the human 
rights of persons outside its territory. The exercise of jurisdiction arises 
when the State of origin exercises effective control over the activities that 
caused the damage and the consequent human rights violation.’343 
Applied to GHG-emissions, it is easy to maintain that the state will often have ‘effective 
control’ over the emitting activities.  
 
The crucial point, however, is – again – if there is a causal link between the emission and ‘the 
negative impact on the human rights of persons outside its territory’. Can the earlier argument 
that the causation of risk is enough to trigger state obligations overcome this hurdle as well? 
This seems very dubious. The IACtHR-test clearly only applies ‘[w]hen transboundary harm 
or damage occurs’ (emphasis added). In this context, the mere causation of risk would hence 
not be sufficient. This is no contradiction to the earlier argument, as it relates to a different 
issue entirely: Earlier, the question was what is required under applicable human rights 
obligations. In the present context, the question is whether certain human rights norms apply 
at all. In light of the starting point of extraterritorial obligations (the state has to indeed have 
control over the affected person), it would overstretch the already extensive new approach by 
the IACtHR if jurisdiction was assumed already in the case of mere risk. In the end, it is 
therefore very difficult to justify ‘jurisdiction’ and hence extraterritorial application in cases 
of climate change.344 
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(2) The exception: The right to self-determination 
There might be one exception to this rule, though: The human right to self-determination. In 
contrast to other human rights guarantees, it has been largely accepted for some time that the 
right to self-determination does indeed apply across territorial and jurisdictional 
boundaries.345 This is supported by the wording of Art. 1(3) ICCPR and ICESCR which 
obligates all ‘States Parties to the present Covenant, including [but not limited to] those 
having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories’ to 
‘respect that right’, which includes the guarantee in subsection 2 that ‘[i]n no case may a 
people be deprived of its own means of subsistence’.  Moreover, in the ICCPR, the right is 
located before the discussed limiting clause of Art. 2(1) ICCPR which indicates that the latter 
does not apply to the right. Sure enough, the parties of both Covenants had colonial situations 
in mind much rather than climate change when drafting these rules in 1966. Nonetheless, the 
provisions can be interpreted to mean that all states must mitigate to make sure that climate 
change impacts do not threaten nations (for example small island states, see above) in their 
sheer existence. 
 
In concrete terms, this would significantly reinforce the case for a duty to mitigate and 
especially the basis of a GHG-budget: While the target of a 2°C increase might not be 
forcibly necessary to avert devastating impacts in some (developed) states and thus not 
required from them under (nationally applied) human rights law, it would certainly be 
mandated to prevent such impacts on small island states.346 
 
Admittedly, this result might seem somewhat arbitrary: On one hand, the full array of global 
human rights of billions of people is impacted by climate change, yet this does not lead to any 
extraterritorial duties on states. On the other hand, what triggers such duties and makes a 
notable difference then is the somewhat peculiar right to self-determination of comparatively 
small populations. Yet, this is owed to the clear wording of Art. 1 ICCPR and ICESCR and 
the broad acceptance of its application beyond borders, as well as the unprecedented scale of 
climate change which indeed threatens entire nations. In the end, it is indeed quite in line with 
basic ideals of human rights law that its requirements shall be guided by the needs of the most 
vulnerable and least powerful. 
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b) Duties of international cooperation 
Besides the ‘direct’ extraterritorial application of human rights duties, there is a conceivable 
way to apply them ‘indirectly’ under a duty to international co-operation with other states.347 
Such an obligation has been referenced for example in the Stockholm Declaration348 and the 
Rio Declaration.349 The most salient basis in human rights law, however, can be found in 
Art. 2(1) ICESCR. It states: 
‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.’350  
In its 2009 report the OHCHR summarized several General Comments by the ICESCR-
Committee and found that under duty to co-operate that states have to, among other things 
‘[r]efrain from interfering with the enjoyment of human rights in other 
countries’ 
and to 
‘[t]ake measures to prevent third parties (e.g. private companies) over 
which they hold influence from interfering with the enjoyment of human 
rights in other countries’351 
On the basis of these duties, there are good arguments for both an extraterritorial duty to 
mitigate: The mentioned requirements are essentially an extraterritorial duty to respect 
(‘refrain from interfering’) and to protect (‘take measures to prevent third parties … from 
interfering’) as described above. One could hence transfer the argument that causation of risk 
can constitute ‘interference’ and thus require states to mitigate enough to reduce risks not only 
at home but also ‘in other countries’.352 
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Albeit, it is very debatable if the duty to co-operate so established by the ICESCR-Committee 
and summarized by the OHCHR does indeed exist as binding international human rights law. 
As mentioned, General Comments in and of themselves do not possess binding power. 
Further, looking at state practice it is questionable if the duty to cooperate can be seen as 
customary international law: Binding international duties have persistently been rejected, 
mostly by developed states.353 
 
On the other hand, such a duty would be very much in line with an established rule of 
international environmental law and general public international law: The no harm-rule. 
According to this rule 
‘[s]tates have … the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.’354 
According to ICJ-case law, the no harm-rule is part of binding international law.355 While it 
originated in other areas of international law, there is no reason why ‘harm’ should exclude 
human rights impacts. This would reinforce the case of a duty not to interfere as part of a 
human rights duty to cooperate as described by the ICESCR-Committee. Moreover, most 
scholars agree that the no harm-rule is applicable to GHG-emissions and climate change.356 
 
The no harm-rule can also help clarify the exact content of a potential duty to cooperate by 
not interfering. The no harm-rule essentially requires states to act with due diligence.357 
Arguably, it is then not impossible to apply the no harm-rule to a risk-based approach as 
advocated here. According to Peel, in the context of climate change, this would require states 
to adopt ‘mandatory emissions reductions consistent with the goal of containing average 
global temperature rise well below’ 2°C above pre-industrial levels’.358 This is in line with the 
reflection that a higher increase would interfere gravely with the ‘enjoyment of human rights’ 
in many countries. In consequence, if one is prepared to accept a state duty to not interfere 
with the enjoyment of human rights in other countries as part of the general duty to cooperate 
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(for which there are good reasons), this would thereby effectively lead to an ‘indirect’ 
extraterritorial duty to mitigate. 
 
c) Summary 
As has been shown, good starting points exist to justify a – direct or indirect – duty to 
mitigate beyond each state’s national borders. A direct extraterritorial application of human 
rights is de lega lata viable only to a very limited extend, namely with regard to the right to 
self-determination under Art. 1 ICCPR and ICESCR. Still, if taken seriously, this would 
reinforce state duties to mitigate substantively. 
 
Alternatively, an indirect extraterritorial duty to mitigate as part of the duty to co-operate is 
more conceivable, although there is yet not much state practice. The no harm-rule, however, 
is firmly established in international environmental and international public law. Its reasoning 
can be transferred to human rights law which would require states not to cause ‘damage’, and 
arguably risk of damage, to human rights in other states.  
 
In effect, both an extraterritorial obligation under the right to self-determination as well as 
under the general duty to cooperate would lead to the by and large same concrete duty: To do 
what is necessary to keep global warming below 2°C or even 1,5°C. In the former case, a 
higher increase would severely jeopardize the right to self-determination of certain peoples. In 
the latter case, a higher rise must be seen to interfere significantly with the enjoyment of 
human rights in many other countries. Thereby, such a duty to mitigate arguably applies to 
states regardless of the concrete impacts of climate change on their own territory. Under 
human rights law, they are not allowed to merely protect their own population, for example 
by limiting themselves to adaptation without mitigation. Instead, they always have to take 
mitigation measures that avert the worst human rights impacts globally. The dystopia of 
‘adaptation-apartheid’ could thus be averted. 
 
VI. Conclusion: The case for a human rights law duty to mitigate 
climate change 
 
The question set out at the beginning of this dissertation was: ‘Does international human 
rights law impose on states a concrete and enforceable duty to mitigate climate change by 




an exaggeration to say that the global, complex problem of climate change fitted well into the 
traditional human rights system. However, the existing framework provides useful starting 
points and sufficient adaptability to be effectively applied to the “one of the greatest threats to 
human rights of our generation”.359 Central issues such as the problem of causation, judicial 
constraints, extraterritorial effects and complex issues of climate justice can be resolved or 
accommodated to a large extent. True enough, the inscrutable causation chain whereby per se 
harmless activities, through emission of per se harmless gases, eventually lead to severe, 
global impairments on the full array of human rights (supra Section III), makes it challenging 
to establish human rights violations and corresponding duties. Albeit, this hurdle is by no 
means unsurmountable: By focusing on a human rights duty to prevent and reduce risks, as 
already distinguishable especially in the European and Inter-American human rights systems, 
states can be held accountable for general causation of human rights impairments (supra 
Section IV). This risk-focused approach provides a viable foundation for a human rights duty 
to mitigate climate change. Moreover, it is possible to reasonably substantiate the content of 
this duty without interfering with state sovereignty or separation of powers by applying a 
flexible standard of reasonableness. Lastly, the duty to mitigate can be corroborated further by 
a limited extraterritorial application of its human rights foundations and thereby help realise 
more climate justice (supra Section V).  
 
Another thing has become clear in the course of the discussion: Much of the progress has 
been achieved due to the dedication of climate activists, be it the Inuit Petition, the Male’ 
Declaration or the Urgenda-Foundation. It can be hoped, that they will continue to “take 
responsibility” and to defend not only their own, but every person’s human rights. 
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